Explaining security integration in the European: intergovernmentalist account by Ertek, Esin
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPLAINING SECURITY INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
 
AN INTERGOVERNMENTALIST ACCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by  
 
ESİN ERTEK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences  
in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Political Science 
 
 
 
Sabancı University  
 
Fall 2005 
 
 
 
EXPLAINING SECURITY INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
 
AN INTERGOVERNMENTALIST ACCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in 
scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ……………………………………………. 
 
 
Assoc. Prof. Meltem Müftüler Baç 
 
Supervisor 
 
 
Examining Committee Members 
 
 
 
 
……………………………………………. 
 
 
Asst. Prof. Burak Arıkan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………………………. 
 
 
Assoc. Prof. Bahri Yılmaz 
 
 
 
 
DATE OF APPROVAL:   10.03.2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Esin Ertek 2005 
 
All rights reserved 
 
EXPLAINING SECURITY INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
 
AN INTERGOVERNMENTALIST ACCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Security integration in the European Union is one of the most significant and 
contentious issues on the integration agenda. It is problematic because security lies 
directly at the core of state sovereignty (i.e. as part of high-politics) and the potential 
implications of its integration threaten the nation-state as the sole exerciser of 
sovereignty. On the other hand, security integration is necessary if the European Union 
is to close the gap between its economic power and political influence in international 
affairs. This dichotomy ensures that security is a recurrent theme in the discussions 
related to the deepening of European integration while it is being conspicuously 
prevented from taking a communitarian characteristic.  
 
In order to account for the dynamics behind the state and development of European 
security integration, this study draws upon intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism 
as two theoretical frameworks offering competing interpretations of the possibility of 
integration in high-politics at the European level and of the relative role public opinion 
plays in shaping member state preferences towards security integration. An analysis of 
the Intergovernmental Conferences leading up to the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties together with Eurobarometer survey data reveals that intergovernmentalism has 
more explanatory power in accounting for the current state of European security 
integration. 
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AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NDE GÜVENLİK ENTEGRASYONUNU AÇIKLAMAK: 
 
HÜKÜMETLERARASICI BİR BAKIŞ 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
 
 
 
Avrupa Birliği’nde güvenlik entegrasyonu, bütünleşme gündemindeki en önemli ve 
tartışmalı konulardan birisidir. Sorunlu olmasının nedeni, güvenlik kavramının devlet 
egemenliğinin çekirdeğinde yer alması ve bütünleşmesinin egemenliğin tek kullanıcısı 
olan milli-devleti tehdit etmesidir. Öte yandan, Avrupa Birliği’nin uluslararası 
ilişkilerde karşılaştığı ekonomik gücü ve siyasi nüfuzu arasındaki uçurumu kapatması 
için güvenlik entegrasyonu gereklidir. Bu ikilik, Avrupa Birliği bütünleşme sürecindeki 
derinleşme tartışmalarında güvenlik konseptinin sürekli gündemde bulunmasına karşın 
ortak mekanizmalar içinde yönetilmesine dikkat çekici bir biçimde engel olunması 
sonucunu doğurmaktadır. 
 
Bu çalışma, güvenlik entegrasyonunun olasılığı ve kamuoyunun güvenlik entegrasyonu 
hususunda üye devlet tercihlerinin oluşmasındaki görece rolü konularında farklı 
yorumlar sunan hükümetlerarasıcılık ve yeni işlevselcilik kuramsal çerçevelerini 
kullanarak Avrupa güvenlik entegrasyonunun durumu ve gelişiminin arkasındaki 
dinamikleri açıklama amacını taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda yapılan, Maastricht, 
Amsterdam ve Nice Anlaşmaları ile sonuçlanmış olan Hükümetlerarası Konferansların 
analizi ve Eurobarometer kamuoyu araştırmalarının çözümlenmesi neticesinde 
hükümetlerarasıcılığın Avrupa güvenlik entegrasyonunun güncel durumunu izah etmede 
daha çok açıklayıcı güce sahip olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: hükümetlerarasıcılık, yeni işlevselcilik, Avrupa Güvenlik ve 
Savunma Politikası (AGSP), güvenlik entegrasyonu 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The European Union (EU) today stands as the pinnacle of transnational integration. 
Nowhere in the world are so many of the presumably vital functions of the nation-state 
transferred to the hands of a supranational organization having jurisdiction over national 
bodies. The EU, in this sense, is a sui generis case of successful regional cooperation, in 
which individuals irrespective of their nationality and residency enjoy common rights 
protected by the European Court of Justice (EJC), live in an internally border-free territory, 
hold a common passport and use a common currency. But there is one traditional function 
of the modern nation-state over which the member states of the EU have resolutely denied 
the supranational institutions any substantial power; namely, control over security policy. 
The considerable discrepancy regarding the depth of integration among these 
different areas exposes a dilemma of European integration. Although building a ‘security 
community’ that would converge on key political and economic policies in order to prevent 
future wars within the continent was a, if not the, central impetus for post-World War II 
European unification, security integration has proved to be the most problematic are of all 
and lagged far behind virtually every other sector of integration. While the integration 
process has reached to a point where a European Constitution is drafted, giving the 
impression that the EU is transforming gradually into a state-like entity, the slow pace and 
lack of substance in foreign policy and security cooperation discredits these developments. 
Taking its cue from this paradox of European unification, this thesis aims to account 
for the state and evolution of the European security integration, most recently embodied in 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP). In order to achieve this objective, two traditional theories of European 
integration, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism will be utilized in the analysis of 
the specific cases of profound leaps in European security integration. 
Discussion on foreign policy and security cooperation at the European level often 
involves these two competing theoretical frameworks of European integration. (Howorth 
2001, Winn 2003) These two strands of thought reflect the competing visions over the kind 
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of Union to be achieved, namely, a federal Europe or an intergovernmental one. These 
opposing positions are most starkly contrasted in areas of high-politics, which cover areas 
that are directly related to the political integrity of the state and its legitimate use of power 
and coercion, signaling another dilemma for security integration: foreign and security 
polices are traditionally the nation-state’s imperative as the highest locus of sovereign 
decision-making authority, and any level of security integration at the European level will 
pave the way towards a complete transfer of competencies from member states to the EU 
institutions.   
In order to account for the possibility of integration in high-politics, neofunctionalism 
and intergovernmentalism offer these contrasting explanations: 
Neofunctionalist proposition on security integration takes the role of supranational 
structures as the main force behind integration; and stresses the spillover from previous 
successes of integration, that is, the transformation and convergence of member states’ 
interests through prior cooperation. So once integration gets under way in low-politics of 
economic and functional cooperation, such as the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), it creates pressure to extend cooperation in different but related issues; and once 
transnational institutions are set-up, they push to extend their authority in further areas of 
integration. Eventually, the spillover effects reach to high-politics, as in the case of 
European Political Cooperation (EPC); and once a competency for security and defense 
issues is transferred to the EU’s institutional structure, such as it was the case with the 
CFSP, this moves the member states to the next level of integration, the ESDP being the 
case in point.  
So the formation of European security procedures and institutions such as the EPC, 
the CFSP and ESDP all seem to imply a linear and gradual replacement of the nation-state 
units by the supranational institutions perpetuated by elite socialization at the EU-level, 
moving incrementally towards a complete transfer of the state’s decision-making authority 
to supranational institutions. (Smith 1998, Collester 2000) 
In such a framework emphasizing supranationality, neofunctionalists ascribe great 
importance to political elites and elite interaction in system-wide institutions in deepening 
transnational integration. This emphasis renders the role of public opinion in member states 
extraneous to how integration proceeds and, consequently, public attributes affecting 
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domestic dynamics are fundamentally ignored. Instead, neofunctionalists give the 
integration process a largely technocratic treatment, and focus on the elite socialization that 
leads to the development of common norms and interests transcending those particular to 
the nation-state. 
From a neofunctionalist perspective, then, profound leaps in security integration 
occur as a result of quasi-automatic processes, operating under the influence of EU-
institutions and outside of public involvement. Giving the Commission a central role in 
setting the integration agenda, the neofunctionalist approach predicts that with every 
Intergovernmental Conference, integration progressively expands through inclusion of new 
issues under the competency of common European institutions, eventually covering all of 
the functions of the nation-state.  
The intergovernmentalist school, on the other hand, argues that high politics will 
remain unaffected by the forces of integration, given that the key actors in integration in 
foreign and security policy are the member states and not the EU institutions. And because 
sovereignty is the central concern of the state, cooperation and integration in high politics is 
strictly limited to the areas in which there is an overlapping of predefined national interests. 
More often than not, however, national preferences are divergent and conflictual, and any 
level supranational cooperation has to reflect the lowest common denominator of these 
preferences.  
Moreover, the formation of these national preferences is not influenced by prior 
supranational cooperation, as neofunctional logic asserts. Instead, they are shaped at the 
domestic level as a result of bargaining processes involving the domestic public, interest 
groups and national governments. (Moravcsik 1993) Public opinion in this theoretical 
framework, then, plays a larger role than it does in neofunctionalism in setting the 
boundaries within which governments determine their national positions during 
intergovernmental negotiations.  
Here, a particular intergovernmentalist distinction regarding security integration is 
that because security is not necessarily an area of direct daily concern to people, issues 
pertaining to security and defense do not usually come under public scrutiny and the public 
in general do not push their government towards further cooperation in these areas. In other 
words, because national governments face far less pressure from domestic actors to 
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delegate/pool their sovereignty in defense and security matters, as opposed to economic or 
trade policies, they are more averse to deepening of integration in high-politics. It is only 
when this seeming public apathy turns into concern, potentially in the light of an external 
event that prioritizes security in the public agenda, that public opinion becomes a variable 
in shaping member state preferences in security integration. In the lack of such an 
externality, although there is a level of security integration achieved at the EU level, be it 
with the CFSP or the ESDP, it is a direct consequence of overlapping state preferences at a 
given time and not the result of an automatic convergence of interests. (Moravcsik 1998, 
Bono 2002)  
Following this logic, intergovernmentalism predicts that member states can consider 
pooling their sovereignty in security matters only when their respective national interests 
shaped at the domestic level converge to such a point that perceived gains of integration 
compensate for the loss of national sovereignty, or when an external event shifts public 
focus on security issues so that public opinion becomes a factor in domestic preference 
formation. Failing to find such a convergence and/or change in public attitude prevents a 
complete transfer of competencies of the nation-state to supranational institution, and any 
bargaining process represents the lowest common denominator of national interests. 
A preliminary evaluation does not dismiss either of these theories; since although 
European security integration has been predominantly intergovernmental, it is also true that 
the EU institutions are gradually incorporated in the mechanisms of security cooperation. 
Nevertheless, taking the abovementioned paradoxically slow speed of security integration, 
the initial intuition is that an intergovernmentalist account would prove to be a better fit for 
the explanation of security integration. Consequently, the focus on the following pages will 
be on the validity of intergovernmentalist approach. 
 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter covers the evolution of the idea 
and institutions of European foreign and security policy cooperation from a historical 
perspective. This analysis provides a compact overview of the extensive work available in 
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the CFSP literature, tracking the roots of security cooperation from its post-World War II 
roots up to the related articles in the present Constitutional Treaty, and introduces the major 
cleavage between intergovernmentalists and supranationalist positions, the issue of nation-
state sovereignty, to be the main dynamic behind European security integration.   
The second chapter deals with neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism as the two 
dominant theories of European integration. Their theoretical positions are laid down, 
followed by an analysis on the relevance of these theorizes for security integration. The 
chapter also tests the validity of intergovernmentalist hypotheses in explaining the CFSP 
and ESDP, as case studies of security integration, taking up the research question 
“intergovernmentalism explains security integration through the CFSP/ESDP by focusing 
on the member state preferences and the bargaining processes between them.” 
The last chapter takes account of the role of public opinion in influencing security 
integration through its impact in shaping government and national preferences. While 
neofunctionalism does not make use of popular opinion as a variable in integration; the 
intergovernmentalist account, in so far as it integrates domestic dynamics in explaining 
shifts in national priorities, regards public opinion as a possible variable interacting with 
domestic governments. The chapter utilizes Eurobarometer survey data on support levels 
for the CFSP and the ESDP, along with the popular support for the EU membership for 
comparison purposes.      
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION 
 
 
 
 
This chapter provides a descriptive account of the foreign policy and defense aspects 
of the European integration from its roots in the European Political Cooperation (EPC) to 
the to-be-ratified European Constitution. The intention here is to highlight major 
developments on the course of the evolution of a Union-wide security and defense policy. 
A related aim is to provide an overview of the procedures and instruments available to 
common security and defense policy; rather than to offer a complete coverage of events 
leading up to the construction and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and, as an integral part of it, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
The chapter evolves first with an analysis of post World War-II security structuring 
followed by an analysis of the EPC and proceeds onto the CFSP and ESDP. 
The development of European security integration as detailed in the following pages 
reveal the perseverance on the sovereignty of the state came to be the major obstacle on the 
road towards integration. It also illustrates the constant conflict between 
intergovernmentalists and supranationalists, and that the divergence of the two approaches 
was typically reflected in security issues where the nation-state felt threatened the most.   
 
 
1.1. Post-War Europe 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the continent was in ruins, both literally 
and figuratively. Basically, there were four main issues in Europe in 1945: reconstruction 
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of Europe, prevention of another war, dealing with the German problem and restoration of 
European power. 
The devastating war had left much of Europe economically and politically destructed 
and socially dislocated, and this setting created a mood for political change. The common 
experience with nationalism and national rivalries that ended up with a catastrophic war 
lent support to federalist visions of a unified Europe, which would tie the futures of the 
peoples of Europe together in such a way that no further war would be possible. It was in 
this setting that the European countries, historically protective of their national 
independence, saw that it was in their respective interests to establish supranational links 
which would pool their sovereignty. At the core of the issue was the ‘German problem;’ 
namely, how to reconstruct Germany economically so that it would be an asset to its allies, 
while containing its military power so that it would not, under any circumstances, pose a 
threat to its neighbors in the continent. But more than anything, it was the changing 
international climate that fueled concrete attempts at change. The division of Europe as 
East and West after 1945 and the ensuing Cold War between the USA and USSR, as the 
new superpowers of the world, raised alarming security concerns for Western Europe. The 
previous ambitions to build a powerful Europe to balance the superpowers were crushed 
with the deterioration of relations with the Soviets. The war-torn European powers lacked 
strong defenses against the perceived territorial aspirations of the USSR. In this setting, the 
direct involvement of the US with its superior financial and military resources in Western 
Europe’s economic and security restructuring became inevitable. (Urwin 2003) 
The central themes of post-war integration of Europe, then, included the safeguarding 
of peace in the continent, political reorganization and economic recovery, integration of 
Germany into the European system, problematic place of Europe in an emerging bipolar 
world and the eminent Soviet threat to the Western Europe. (Aybet 1997, Dedman 1996, 
George and Bache 2001) In response to these challenges, some predictable and some 
imaginative courses of action were introduced in the post-war setting of Europe. But the 
nature of these themes put the security restructuring of the continent at the core of the 
problem. There were three alternative routes introduced to cover the defense of Western 
Europe.  
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First of these was a European initiative. France and Britain signed the Treaty of 
Dunkirk of 1947. They were later joined by the Benelux countries 1948 to form the 
Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) until it changed its name to Western European Union 
(WEU) with the addition of West Germany and Italy in 1954’s Paris Agreements. With a 
guarantee to collective defense, the Brussels Treaty Organization was tellingly agreed upon 
within weeks of the rise of the Communist Party to power in Czechoslovakia and three 
months before the Soviet blockade of West Berlin started. But the main motivation behind 
these two treaties was the prevention of the reemergence of the German aggression more 
than an alliance against the looming Soviet threat. 
The answer to the Soviet threat was found in the American willingness for a 
leadership role in Western security. The U.S. hegemony would benefit the Europeans in 
enabling them to take their focus away from security and the vast costs it would bring, and 
instead pay attention to other issues and utilize their scarce resources in integration and 
development of the continent.  
The price they were to pay for transferring the defense costs to the U.S. was 
accepting Germany in the security arrangements. The Americans saw West Germany as an 
integral part of the defense of the Europe and pushed for the integration of a militarily 
potent Germany into the European system. This perspective led to the second path, namely, 
the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 that would provide 
for the security of Western Europe. The organization was initiated and dominated by the 
US and so it was to provide a framework within which West Germany would be 
incorporated into the Western European security architecture. 
Another European attempt for the new security arrangement was the preparations for 
a European Defense Community (EDC). Originally devised by the Schuman Committee 
headed by Jean Monnet, its main purpose was to protect the status quo and delay German 
rearmament. After the Korean War broke out in 1950, however, the U.S. pressure on 
France to include West Germany in NATO increased. France showed strong resistance to 
this design and instead proposed the Pleven Plan for a European Army, which would 
include German troops. The apparent aim of the plan was to create a European Defense 
Community, duplicating the institutional structure of ECSC. It was devised to be linked to a 
European Political Community that would provide for the democratic accountability of the 
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EDC. The plan was met with suspicion by the Dutch and British as a way to further French 
interests. In the end, the raison d’etre of the Pleven Plan, which was to stop German 
rearmament rather than to create a supranational mechanism for European defense became 
its undoing when the French National Assembly rejected the EDC in 1954. Nevertheless, 
the failure of EDC was partly a success for the French for it successfully delayed German 
rearmament and entry into NATO for almost five years until the creation of the Western 
European Union (WEU) on the basis of the Brussels Treaty. (Dedman 1996)  
In any case, after this failed attempt for the ratification of the EDC the issues of 
common European defense were effectively transferred to NATO under the US control. 
The NATO, in the end, provided a safeguard to Europe without channeling all of their 
scarce resources to military spending and eliminated the need for a separate European 
security structure. It was only after the end of the Cold War in 1989 that any significant 
inter-European development in this area could be achieved. 
It was in this setting of acknowledged American hegemony that Western Europe 
could focus on functional and sectoral cooperation in order to make sure that there would 
not be any future wars within the continent. Specifically, the West Germany was 
experiencing a fast economic recovery at the time, rekindling the fears of the continental 
Europeans. The attempted French answer to the ‘German problem’ was integration in 
economic area, constructed around a supranational ‘High Authority’ in the key strategic 
resources of coal and steel with the Schuman Plan of 1950. Satisfying the interests of 
France, Germany and the U.S., and incorporating Italy and the Benelux countries into the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the ‘Europe of the Six,’ that would also 
make up the EEC six years later, was hence formed in 1951. (McAllister 1997)  
But the coming years brought considerable opposition to European integration and 
national divisions began to emerge regarding the kind of integration advocated, most 
notably illustrated by Charles de Gaulle. 
One year after the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) with 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957, de Gaulle became the new president of France. With his 
outright resentment to supranationalism and dislike of any non-French hegemony over 
European affairs, de Gaulle put his stamp on European integration. In trying to reassert 
French influence, he proposed to the other members of the EEC a ‘Union of States’ that 
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would incorporate foreign policy and defense matters into the Community on strictly 
intergovernmental lines, all the while obstructing the accession negotiations of the British 
into the EEC. When the small EC states rejected the so-called Fouchet Plan amid the 
general impasse between the supranational and intergovernmental visions of Europe and 
after the French veto on British entry, de Gaulle sought for bilateral defense cooperation 
with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, with whom he had established a Franco-
German axis on Community matters. Elysee Treaty of 1963 established a Franco-German 
partnership to promote cooperation in foreign policy, defense and culture. But the diverging 
German economic interests over the admission of Britain and its insistence on the inclusion 
of a reference to the Atlantic alliance in the Treaty would not allow the implementation of 
the provisions of the agreement. (McAllister 1997) The growing tensions between France 
and the rest of the EC eventually resulted in traumatic events such as the ‘empty chair 
crisis’1 of 1965 and the withdrawal of France from NATO and expulsion of NATO 
Headquarters from France.  The period suggested that not only foreign policy and security 
cooperation but the whole European integration was at stake.  
 
 
1.2. European Political Cooperation 
 
It was only after the resignation of Charles de Gaulle in 1969 that the road towards 
further European integration was opened. Indeed, changes of government in France and 
Germany, with Georges Pompidou in the former who declared that France would not object 
to British membership and Willy Brandt who confirmed that his pursuit of Ostpolitik would 
not entail a disregard of German obligations to the Community, paved the way for the 
Hague Summit of 1969, with the goals of ‘completion, widening and deepening.’ (George 
and Bache 2001) On the problem of deepening, the Hague Summit concluded that “Europe, 
as such, is absent from the world dialogue,” (Bronstone 2000) and asked for the preparation 
of a report on increasing political (foreign policy) cooperation. The next year’s Luxemburg 
                                                 
1 In July 1965 Charles de Gaulle ordered a French boycott of the Council of Ministers and 
withdrew France's permanent representative to the Community. 
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Report2 by proposing a framework within which member states could formulate ‘common 
positions’ on international issues paved the way for the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC). 
The internal dynamics of the EC was the main force behind the EPC initiative. The 
aforementioned ‘deepening’ objective of the Hague Summit had specified the creation of a 
common European policy, as a concession to French for their compliance on the matters of 
‘completion’ (enhancing the role of the Community institutions on the EC budget) and 
‘widening’ (accepting the British accession). The insistence of French stemmed mostly 
from the Gaullist legacy and their traditional objective to secure West Germany within the 
European system. The smaller member-states also saw that they would gain from a 
common approach to foreign policy now that the Gaullist era ended and the British would 
provide a counter-force to the dominance aspirations of the French within the Community. 
(Aybet 1997) But it was also the need to counterweigh the growing economical power that 
was deemed necessary at a time when interests and preferences of the EC member states in 
Vietnam and the Middle East were neglected by their transatlantic ally. However, the issue 
of incorporating foreign policy into the Community was still a sensitive issue because of its 
negative repercussions on the sovereignty of the nation-state. 
So the EPC was born as a procedure for consultation between the high-ranking 
officials of the EC member states and to coordinate national foreign policy positions. It was 
launched in 1970, albeit outside the framework of the treaties. This meant that the decisions 
agreed within the EPC were not binding on the member-states, the Commission was only 
associated with the EPC with no right to propose or vote, and the EPC was outside the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In parallel to the conception, the goals 
set were modest, as well. The EPC had a weak formal structure. Foreign Ministers of the 
member countries were to have meetings every six months to harmonize their positions on 
international issues, and a Political Committee, composed of the directors of political 
affairs, was established to assist the Ministers in their affairs. Similarly, the tools available 
to the EPC were limited to diplomatic declarations of ‘common positions’ on international 
issues. Basically, the EPC was an attempt to provide a mechanism through which member 
                                                 
2 Also referred to as the “Davignon Report,” named after Etienne Davignon, the president 
of the Committee responsible for preparing the report. 
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states could consult one another on foreign policy decisions, rather than a setting for 
common European policy making. 
The period between 1970 and 1973 saw the strengthening of EPC procedures. The 
Copenhagen Report now offered ‘joint action’ as well as ‘common positions’ as the aim of 
the consultations. The Foreign Ministers were to meet at least four times a year while the 
Political Committee would convene as many times as necessary. The report also 
recommended the creation of correspondents’ and working groups and the establishment of 
COREU (CORrspondance EUropéenne), a telegram network for enhanced communication 
between member states. While the involvement of EPC with the EC remained “distinct,” 
close contact between the Commission and EPC would be sustained “when EPC matters 
had an incidence on Community activities.” So, although EPC remained intergovernmental 
there was also an acknowledgement that the political cooperation could not be developed 
without any connection with the communitarian aspects of the EC. As a result, the links 
between EPC and the institutions of the EC were established. (Bronstone 2000) 
The first years of the decade also presented circumstances to test the ability of the 
evolving EPC to achieve its aspirations of coordinated action. Arguably the most 
significant of these were related to the Arab-Israeli relations centered on the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War. The decision of the Arab-dominated Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) countries to stop oil shipment to the US and other Western countries that 
supported Israel and the subsequent price rises devastated the Western economies. But 
instead of a concerted response certain EC member states, including France and Britain, 
opted for bilateral agreements with the oil-producing Arab countries to minimize the 
negative effects on their national economies; whereas others such as the Netherlands 
suffered an oil embargo because of its pro-Israeli stance. The US was pushing for a joint 
response against the OPEC countries, and Germans were also advocating an oil-consumers’ 
cartel. The French, however, were once again suspicious of the role of the US as a 
hegemonic leader. But through the EPC meetings divergence among national perspectives 
narrowed towards a pro-Arab perspective and the EC issued a resolution on November 
1973 that reaffirmed the Franco-British position on the issue, prompting the OPEC to lift its 
embargo from all of the Community members, even though it inevitably put further strains 
on transatlantic relations. Fitting with the intergovernmentalist approach, these 
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developments showed that when a common interest was threatened, a concerted response 
could be produced. Through subsequent EPC meetings and with the leadership of France, 
the EC initiated the Euro-Arab Dialogue in 1974 that enabled the Community to improve 
its trade relations with the Arab OPEC countries. This initiative eventually culminated in 
the Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980 that included a need for “recognition of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” This implied support of the Palestinians’ right 
to a homeland provided further tension in the relations with the US, but the EPC framework 
was not adequate to enable the EC in backing up its declaration with concrete action.   
Still, together with the German-led initiative on alleviating East-West relations that 
resulted in the 1975’s Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation, a process the US 
perceived to open the way towards legitimizing the Communist rule in the East, the Euro-
Arab Dialogue became one of the more successful instances of the EPC at work. (George 
and Bache 2001)  
The changes brought up by the new decade, however, showed that the EPC had to be 
modified once again. In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the EC members failed 
to agree on a common position on the issue. While Britain wanted to follow the US lead in 
boycotting the Moscow Olympics, neither France nor West Germany was persuaded. The 
fact that the American response to the bellicose USSR policies was starting to get more 
aggressive heightened the fears of Western European security. It was in this background 
that 1981’s London Report was prepared. Rather than making it more supranational, the 
aim of the Report was to offer practical improvements to the EPC in order to “shape events 
and not merely react to them.” (Smith 2004) The Report recommended the coordination of 
political aspects of security while changing the goal of EPC to ‘joint action.’ To this end, 
procedural changes of strengthening the role of the EPC Presidency, full association of the 
EC Commission with EPC and the establishment of the Troika Secretariat to ensure 
continuity were introduced to the system. This marked the first time that security, though 
only with its political aspects, was mentioned in the Community context. (Bonvicini 1998) 
The escalation of Soviet-U.S. tensions at the beginning of the new decade after a long 
period of detente, the EC’s inability to act internationally and the growing dissatisfaction 
with U.S policies also relaunched the Franco-German dialogue creating a lightly armed 
joint brigade and, with British involvement, revived the moribund WEU by reinstating 
 13
ministerial meetings; but a much more ambitious and premature attempt was the Genscher-
Combo Draft European Act of 1982. The Draft Act, which sought to “make it possible for 
the member states to act in concert in world affairs so that Europe will increasingly be able 
to assume the international role incumbent upon it,” (Dinan 2004) and proposed to increase 
efficiency by formally integrating EPC into the Community structure, was rejected. It was 
only with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 that the EPC was given a legal treaty 
basis under the ‘single’ framework of the European Council, without changing the basic 
nature and methods of its workings. Specifically, Title III of the SEA stated that EPC could 
discuss “political and economic aspects of security” and that “the external policies of the 
EC and the policies agreed in Political Cooperation must be consistent.”  
So, the SEA gave the EPC a written basis for the first time but the fact that the EPC 
was firmly left out of the jurisdiction of the ECJ showed that this agreement was yet 
another instance of compromise between those, such as Germans and Italians, advocating 
further political integration and other states like Britain, or small states like Ireland, 
showing deep reservations regarding a possible shift in the locus of foreign policy-making. 
In the end, the incremental but steady evolution of the Political Cooperation was a 
result of both the internal dynamics of the Community and the external developments that 
had direct impacts on altering the interests of the member states. The evolution of the EPC 
and its legitimization in the SEA demonstrated that security integration was left to the 
intergovernmental processes and was to be exclusively handled by the member states. 
Although the EPC framework with its informal but regular meetings gradually 
resulted in what could be termed as a ‘consultation reflex’ among member states (Nuttall 
2000), it firmly excluded the issues of defense and security; and the notions of national 
sovereignty, independent decision making, and the notion of domaine reserve preserved 
their prevalence in foreign policy in Europe. (Jorgensen 1992) And after twenty years of 
working practices, the EPC came to represent an example of intergovernmental cooperation 
without formal integration, whose mechanisms largely failed to promote convergence on 
national attitudes. (Forster and Wallace 2000)  
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1.3. Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
For nearly two decades, the Community members had been able to adapt their 
decentralized system of foreign policy cooperation to the changing international context 
through their shared experiences, all the while steering away from any weakening of its 
strict intergovernmental mechanics. Given that there was not any pressing need that called 
for further integration in foreign policy and security areas, the member states were naturally 
disinclined to do away with this significant bastion of national sovereignty. But two major 
factors; namely, the abrupt systemic transformation from the predictable Cold War system 
and the slow prior evolution of the foreign policy and security integration demonstrated that 
an informal system like the EPC with no permanent organization to administer its workings 
and back its decisions was very inadequate for the EC to face the security challenges posed 
by this new world. 
Indeed, the radical geo-political transformations between 1989 and 1991, such as the 
end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR, the reunification of Germany and the 
rising tension in the Balkans had inevitable effects on the perceptions of the member states 
both of their own changing roles and that of the EC in the international arena, which in turn 
culminated in a formal Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as the second pillar 
of the new European Union (EU).  
The fast and unexpected pace of developments across central Europe, the risk of 
destabilization in the region and, most importantly, the prospect of a reunified Germany 3 
in 1990 facilitated the joint support of Germany and France to the Belgium proposition for 
an IGC on Political Union together with the already scheduled one on economic and 
monetary cooperation. (Laursen, VanHoonacker and Wester 1992)  
But as, one might expect, member states had different preferences and conflicting 
positions on whether they would benefit more from a supranational CFSP architecture or 
from keeping the intergovernmental line that shaped their final agreement on the Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU). In the background of negotiations leading up to the TEU were 
the Gulf War and Yugoslavia crisis (Dinan 1999) and the negotiations between the 
                                                 
3 Similar to developments up to the EDC Treaty (1952), mostly driven by the prospects of 
keeping Germany under control, this is yet another instance of how to keep Germany in 
check through European integration.  
 15
differing positions of the member states were affected by the involvement of the EC in 
them. 
The inability of the EC in handling those crises lent some support to the view that the 
national perceptions and interests were too divergent to be accommodated within a single 
framework. Conversely, it was also used to show that the existing machinery was 
inadequate and ineffective and had to be integrated into the Community structure. (George 
and Bache 2001) These positions were favored by the British and Delors’ French, 
respectively. So, on the question of foreign policy, the U.K-led the pack of Denmark, 
Greece and Portugal insisted on keeping the intergovernmental nature of the EPC while 
France and Germany, supported by the Benelux countries and Italy was in favor of a strong 
common policy; where in defense and security matters the split occurred mostly between 
the U.K, Netherlands and Portugal i.e. the Atlanticists, on the one hand, and the rest, 
headed by France, with Denmark, Greece and Portugal adopting distinct national policies. 
(Nuttall and Edwards 1994) In this respect, the role of WEU was also an important part of 
the negotiations. Where the Atlanticists saw WEU as a “permanent bridge” between NATO 
and the Union, the French supported the image of a “ferry” that would gradually transfer 
the defense functions of NATO to the EU. (Forster and Wallace 2000) After proposals 
including a British-led Rapid Reaction Corps within NATO and the upgrading of Franco-
German brigade into EUROCORPS to form the core of a European army, the Rome 
Declaration after the NATO Summit of 1991 showed acceptance of a European Defense 
Identity, all the while acknowledging the primacy of NATO in defense cooperation. 
In the end, the result of the IGC bargaining was more in favor of the minimalists, 
with their success at creating a separate intergovernmental pillar for the CFSP as the next 
incremental and logical step from the EPC and keeping it out of the Community pillar.  
The TEU, signed on 7 February 1992, stated that it was among the goals of the Union 
“to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of 
a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common 
defense policy, which might lead to a common defense.” (Article B) 4  
                                                 
4 The article numbers refer to the original version, prior to the amnedments in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
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A number of compromises were reached between the intergovernmentalists and 
supranationalists in the EU. These were concerned with the objectives, institutionalisation, 
tools and decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP. The explicit objectives of the CFSP 
was set forth in Article J-1 and included defense of EU’s common values and fundamental 
interests; strengthening the security of the Union; preserving peace and strengthening 
international security; promoting international cooperation; consolidating democracy and 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the 
Commission was to be fully associated with the CFSP and could initiate proposals, sharing 
this right with the Council. (Article J-9) Nevertheless, it was only the Council that could 
direct the CFSP. 
In coherence with EPC practices, the presidency and the troika would represent the 
CFSP externally, meaning that the EU was missing a single ‘phone number.’ But unlike the 
EPC, and although allocated a small portion, the CFSP could be financed by the 
Community budget. In a further attempt of strengthening institutionalization, the EPC 
Secretariat merged into Council Secretariat and the Commissioner for External Political 
Affairs was created. 
In the implementation of CFSP, two major policy instruments were introduced. These 
were ‘common positions’ and ‘joint actions,’ although their distinctions were not clearly 
drawn in the Treaty. As one observer writes, though, common positions were conceived to 
facilitate “systematic cooperation,” whereas joint actions were “to allow member states to 
act together in concrete ways based on a Council decision as to the specific scope of such 
actions, the EU’s objectives in carrying them out, and the duration, means and procedures 
for their implementation.” (Dinan 2004)  
The decision making process was yet another instance of compromise between the 
intergovernmentalists and supranationalists. Qualified majority voting (QMV), where each 
member state is allocated a number of votes according to the size of its population, was 
introduced into the CFSP system. Normally this would be a strong advancement towards 
supranationalism, because it replaces the need for unanimity in reaching common decisions 
and the possibility of unilateral veto, through pooling of sovereignty. (Moravcsik 1998) But 
in this case, QMV was to be limited to decisions on joint actions that had to be adopted in 
the Council by consensus, and even in that case, all states had to agree to accept it in case 
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by case basis. This was a small victory for those states, such as Britain, keen on protecting 
their national sovereignty, and others, like Ireland, sensitive on keeping their neutrality. 
(Dinan 1999) 
As for the relations with the WEU, any merger with the EU institutions was not 
possible because of the opposition of the Atlanticists. The compromise was that the Union 
identified the WEU as an “integral part of the development of the Union,” that would 
“elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense 
implications.” Even though WEU was recognized as the defense arm of the EU, there were 
two problems against such a scheme. The Petersberg Tasks declared in June 1992 limited 
the potential activity of WEU to peace-keeping, humanitarian and crisis-management tasks 
in Europe; excluding common defense. Subsequently, a Combined Joint Task Forces 
(CJTF) as a solution incorporating NATO was launched in 1996. The other problem 
stemmed from the attempt to accommodate the differing memberships in the EU, WEU and 
NATO. By introducing observers, associates and associate partners WEU totaled in 28 
members with differing rights and obligations, which further complicated the issue of a 
possible WEU-EU merger. (Smith 2003) 
The period until the 1996 IGC did not prove to be a good showcase for the CFSP and 
EU in general. The challenges of the Yugoslavian conflict and especially the situation of 
Bosnia, further complicated transatlantic relations. While demonstrating WEU and CFSP’s 
lack of competence in providing effective and rapid common initiatives and military action, 
this phase confirmed, more than anything, the predominance of national legacies in foreign 
policy. The variety of approaches within the EU further increased with the accession of the 
non-aligned Austria, Sweden and Finland, which, in turn, gave rise to a “northern 
perspective,” with a focus on Baltic region. (Forster and Wallace 2000)  
In this background, the IGC convened “to address the effectiveness and potential 
reform of CFSP” and concluded with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which amended 
several provisions for increased coherence regarding the CFSP. (Articles 11-28) 
Specifically, ‘common strategies’ were added to common positions and joint actions 
as a formal CFSP instrument. Common strategies were defined “to be implemented by the 
Union in areas where the member states have important interests in common” and they 
would “set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available to the Union 
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and the Member State.” (Article 13-2) The novelty here was that, once a common strategy 
was adopted by the Council, decisions, joint actions and common positions could be 
accepted by means of QMV. Still, this change would not apply to decisions with military 
and defense implications. 
In an attempt to improve the effectiveness and visibility of the CFSP, the Amsterdam 
Treaty introduced two significant innovations. The first one was the so-called ‘constructive 
abstention.’ While the strong role of the Council in the decision making process was 
confirmed, for effective decision-making processes constructive abstention was 
incorporated into the Treaty in line with the larger-scale discussions on ‘flexibility’ of 
European integration. (George and Bache 2001) Constructive abstention allowed any 
member state to abstain from voting without blocking a decision; this was seen by the EU 
as a chance to offer states opposing a decision a way to stay away while enabling the others 
to go on with their collective decision. 
The second innovation was the post of ‘High Representative for the CFSP.’ This 
position was created in an attempt to provide a ‘single number’ for the Union. The High 
Representative would assist the rotating Council presidency that was still responsible for 
the CFSP affairs. The Mr./Ms. CFSP was to replace the past presidency in the troika and 
would also head the new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which was to provide 
early warning crises and prepare policy papers. The first occupier of the post would be the 
well known Javier Solana, a former Spanish foreign minister and NATO Secretary General. 
Overall, his contributions to the Middle East peace process and a solution to the 
Macedonian conflict helped the new post to have visibility as the face of EU foreign policy. 
As for the WEU, the EU could now ‘avail itself’ of WEU on defense issues, as 
opposed to ‘requesting’ WEU action. Additionally, the WEU “would provide the Union 
with access to an operational capability,” which, in effect, meant the initiation of the 
Petersberg Tasks. (Dashwood 2000) Although the Amsterdam Treaty paved the way for 
better adaptation to future developments by inscribing flexibility into the system, it was the 
sea change in the U.K that defined the future course of CFSP.   
The increasing marginalization of the U.K from the Franco-German-led core of the 
Union, most strikingly seen in its absence from the Euro and Schengen zones, coupled with 
its disillusionment with the Bosnian experience and the impending Kosovo crisis combined 
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to result in the British u-turn in its stance towards a common European defense. (Missiroli 
2000) In stating that the Union had to have “capacity for autonomous action” while “acting 
in conformity” with respective obligations in NATO, St Malo Declaration of December 
1998 represented a compromise between the British and French together with American 
consent (Sloan 2000), and it opened the way for the prospect of adding a defense dimension 
to European integration.  
 
 
1.4. European Security and Defense Policy 
 
The previous development of the EPC/CFSP had demonstrated that 
institutionalization of cooperation in intergovernmental decision-making. But given that the 
security and defense realms were traditionally excluded from the supranational foreign 
policy making, any spillover pressures from the CFSP into a common defense policy 
outside the NATO framework would only be actualized in the face of another systemic 
change. The change, this time, was brought on by the Balkans, in the backyard of the EU.  
The possibility of widespread chaos threatening the security of Europe, coupled with 
the fact that even at the end of the twentieth century crimes against humanity could be 
committed in Europe on such a scale while the EU members could not, once again, agree 
on a common position among themselves, let alone with the US, was truly a wake up call. 
What they also realized was that even when member state positions were in accord, the EU 
was not taken seriously by the Serbians since they lacked the military capabilities for joint 
action unless the reluctant Americans, who appeared to have an increasing desire for 
isolationism, entered into the equation. 
So the Kosovo conflict and the perceived ambiguousness of the American position 
facilitated the rapid Europeanization of the St Malo agreement for a European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). (Haine 2004) In June 1999, the European Council in Cologne laid 
the foundations for the ESDP: As part of the CFSP, the ESDP was to be developed to 
incorporate crisis management and conflict prevention. The member states declared that 
they were “resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international 
stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and 
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capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security 
and defense… the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order 
to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” 
In line with this declaration, six months later in the Helsinki European Council the 
member states gave the ESDP a concrete substance, in an attempt to substantiate the 
capabilities part of the ‘capabilities/expectations gap.’ The agreed ‘headline goal’ was to 
prepare a self-sustaining military force of 15 brigades (50,000-60,000 persons), capable of 
the Petersberg Tasks, that could be organized in 60 days and maintained for at least one 
year, with the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) ready to be deployed far more quickly. 
In December 2000, the Treaty of Nice formalized the Helsinki conclusions to 
establish the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military 
Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) in the Council of the 
EU. Moreover, the defense part of the CFSP would now be structured not by the WEU but 
by the EU itself, effectively integrating WEU into the EU. Another important change was 
the evolution of flexibility into ‘enhanced cooperation’ for protecting “the values and 
serving the interests of the EU when asserting its identity as a coherent force on the 
international scene.” (Article 27) This concept could be applied towards the implementation 
of an action or of a common position; and if no member state opposed or requested a 
unanimous decision of the Council, the particular decision could be reached by QMV. But 
this enhanced cooperation would not include defense cooperation, as a result of the British 
fear that this would prevent the non-EU member states, such as Turkey, from participating 
in the RRF. (Smith 2004) The general problem Turkey posed by rejecting the Nice 
provisions of the ‘Berlin-plus’ framework, which was to provide the EU access to NATO 
assets and capabilities, was eventually solved in December 2002 .(Gnesotto 2004)  
On the whole, this new era in European defense and security produced successful EU 
civilian/military operations, which all contributed to building up the ability and a common 
approach on peacekeeping missions in the international context. Most notably, these 
missions included those in Bosnia, Macedonia and Congo. Specifically, the civilian EU 
Police Mission in Bosnia the EU took over from the UN’s International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) in January 2003 was to develop police independence and accountability; the 
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military Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia taking over 
NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony in March 2003 was charged with patrolling, 
surveillance and reconnaissance in the region, while its immediate civilian follow-up Police 
Operation Proxima in December 2003 was to consolidate law and order; June 2003’s 
military Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo aimed to stabilize security 
conditions and improve the humanitarian situation; and the transfer of peacekeeping 
mission in Bosnia from the NATO-led Stabilization Forces (SFOR) to the EU’s RRF under 
Operation Althea in December 2004 was assigned with the task of monitoring compliance 
with the Dayton peace agreement. 
 
 
1.5. European Strategy Document 
 
The rapid progress made possible with the St Malo process faced a new challenge 
after the 11 September terrorist attacks. The proposals of St Malo had been prepared with 
the particular European experience in the Balkans, and could not be adequate in the face of 
a radically changed international environment. After 9/11, international terrorism replaced 
the post-Cold War era and became the new paradigm in international relations. Americans 
abandoned isolationism, and as the U.S foreign policy became more unilateral and the Bush 
administration decided to expand the operations from Afghanistan to Iraq, a serious crisis 
emerged within NATO and the EU at a time where talks for a constitutional treaty were 
proceeding. 
It was in this context that June 2003’s European Strategy Document entitled ‘A 
Secure Europe in a Better Word” was produced. This so-called Solana Doctrine marked the 
first time that EU produced a global approach to foreign and security policies in an effort 
“to define the EUs global interests and how the Union [was to] promote and defend them.” 
(Haine 2004) Indeed, the document was the first concrete response to those critical of 
security integration citing lack of identifiable common European interests in this area. As a 
novelty, the document identified certain threats including international terrorism, 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, failed states, and 
organized crime. The document acknowledged that in countering these attacks the line of 
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defense would be set abroad. But unlike the preventive strike scheme of the U.S National 
Security Strategy of 2002, defense would be organized with a combination of political, 
economic, civil and military approaches. The document also elaborated on ‘preventive 
engagement’ to endorse stability through humanitarian operations, economic aid and the 
like, and ‘effective multilateralism’ that recognized the UN Charter as the main framework 
within which international relations would operate. The introduction of these two concepts, 
in the end, entails an awareness on the part of the Union of its need to upgrade its “civilian-
only” approach to “soft-power-plus.” (Haine 2004) But in any case, the adoption of the 
strategy document is meaningful only to the extent that it is continuously backed by 
national political will. 
 
 
1.6. The Constitutional Treaty 
 
Along with the latest and largest wave of enlargement, the Constitutional Treaty 
represents the manifestation of the EU’s two major priorities: deepening and widening. The 
prospects of integrating ten new member states to the already cumbersome mechanisms of 
the EU, the perceived complexities and inadequacies of the previous treaties and the 
persistent ‘democratic deficit’ within the EU procedures culminated in efforts towards 
achieving the next step in supranational institutionalization, with the aim of gathering 
broader support from EU citizens and interest groups at large. It was evident that if the 
enlarged EU was to function effectively both domestically and in the international scene, 
making the integrated Europe more democratic, transparent and accessible towards its 
citizens was essential. (Forsberg 2004) 
There were various debates as to how this process could evolve, including setting up 
an elected EU President post and doing away with the Commission. In the end, December 
2001’s European Council meeting in Laeken, with the forthcoming enlargement to include 
CEECs, Malta and Cyprus in perspective and within weeks after 9/11, set out the process 
towards a European constitution. The Laeken Declaration offered that the citizens of 
Europe “… want[ed] to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and defense, 
in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in and 
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around Europe and in the rest of the world.”  It also mentioned the challenge of developing 
“a more coherent common foreign policy and defense policy.” On the whole, however, the 
CFSP and ESDP issues were only lightly touched upon; and t was a surprising feat at a time 
when Javier Solana had declared that ESDP would be the EU’s new principal integration 
objective after the success with the Euro. (Ehrhart 2002)   
The Convention on the Future of Europe, taking the Declaration as a starting point for 
the discussions on the Constitutional Treaty, assembled in February 2002. It included 
representatives of the member state parliaments, the European Parliament, and the 
European Commission. For effective dealing with specific issues, Working Groups were 
organized including those on ‘External Action’ (WG VII) and ‘Defense’ (WG VIII). 
Working independently, these two groups presented their recommendations in their final 
reports in December 2002. (Haine 2003) The discussions on the draft Treaty, which 
included most of those recommendations, started with the IGC on the Future of Europe in 
October 2003. However, the governments could not agree on the draft at the December 
2003 European Council in Brussels and a consensus could be reached only with the June 
2004 European Council in Brussels. In the end, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe was signed on 29 October 2004. Both the Constitutional Treaty and the 2003 IGC 
brought certain considerable changes to the CFSP and ESDP in some areas and reaffirmed 
the previous positions in others. Still, one should note that the intensity of debates within 
the Convention regarding the Union’s foreign policy and defense has been left far behind 
those that took place outside the Convention, meaning that the number and substance of the 
Treaty articles cannot be deemed as the only major restrictions on the role of the EU on the 
international politics. (Whitman 2003) 
Regarding CFSP, the Constitutional Treaty puts down provisions in Title I, Articles 
16, 40 and 41 and Title III, Articles 294 - 313.  Specifically, the Constitutional Treaty 
proclaims that “the Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy 
shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, 
including the progressive framing of a common defense policy that might lead to a 
common defense,” and that “the Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the 
Union’s common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and 
shall comply with the Union’s action in this area… [and] they shall refrain from action 
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contrary to the Union’s interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.” (Article I-16) The 
language here is evidently similar to the phrasing in the TEU. 
In an attempt to further substantiate the CFSP, new institutions including the 
President of the European Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European External 
Action Service are introduced to the system.  
Indeed, perhaps one of the most important innovations of the Constitutional Treaty is 
the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. By effectively combining the 
responsibilities of the High Representative for the CFSP and the External Relations 
Commissioner, the post is intended to guarantee the consistency and coherence of the 
Union’s external action by giving the Minister the responsibility of conducting the CFSP 
and ESDP.  
The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is to be appointed by the European Council 
with qualified majority voting, be one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission 
and he/she is stipulated to take part in the work of the European Council. (Article I-28)  
Apart from the other loosely mentioned roles of the Minister, on the whole, the 
Constitutional Treaty does not provide a detailed blueprint for the post. In this way, not 
only the existing differences between the member states on the roles of the Commission 
and the Council in shaping CFSP is acknowledged but a maneuver area for future revisions 
is created. This ambiguity also means the personality of the office holder will have 
significant effect on the development of the post, just as it was in the case of the High 
Representative. (Missiroli 2004) 
Correspondingly, the Constitutional Treaty does not offer a clear position as to whom 
to call when trying to reach Europe. The Foreign Affairs Minister is not the sole figure 
representing the Union on external relations. Except for CFSP matters, it is the Commission 
that represents the EU. Even in the issues related to the CFSP, it is among the European 
Council President’s duties to guarantee external representation albeit “without prejudice to 
the responsibilities of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.” (Article I-22) 
In addition to the Union Minister, two other important aspects of cohesion in foreign 
and security policy and in defense policy introduced by the Constitutional Treaty are 
related to mutual defense and solidarity, and cooperation in defense matters. The mutual 
defense clause included in the Constitutional Treaty states that “if a Member State is the 
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victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it 
an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.” Nevertheless, the article ensures that the commitments in 
these situations “shall be consistent with commitments under the NATO, which for those 
States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the 
forum for its implementation.” (Article I-41/7)  It is worth noting that the first draft of the 
clause had emphasized the voluntary aspect of cooperation among “participating Member 
States” against armed aggression, and only “close cooperation” with NATO. Debate on this 
clause coincided with the controversy regarding an EU operations program set out by 
Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg in the spring of 2003 that would have an 
autonomous military headquarters near Brussels. Amid fears of creating divisions between 
Member States and also with the US, the clause was revised in the IGC as above. The 
solidarity clause, on the other hand, was prepared to oblige Member States to act jointly in 
the case of a terrorist attack against a Member State or a natural or man-made disaster.  
(Article I-43) Contrary to the debates on the mutual defense clause, this one did not, 
perhaps understandably, cause any controversy because it stressed the limitation of the 
action to the territory of the particular Member State. (Missiroli 2004) 
The Constitutional Treaty expands ‘enhanced cooperation’ of the Treaty of Nice to 
include cooperation in defense, but in CFSP matters enhanced cooperation will only be 
possible in the existence of unanimity. 
Overall, the new articles in the Constitutional Treaty, in line with the past 
experiences, try to provide for a more flexible and effective foreign and security policy. 
And, in the end, it is a step forward but only a small and incremental one since there are no 
changes to the prevalence of intergovernmentalism and unanimity in the CFSP/ESDP 
decision-making mechanisms. 
 
 
1.7. Conclusions 
 
The evolution of the foreign and security cooperation, from its pre-natal roots in the 
EPC to its incorporation of the ESDP, illustrate a gradual and incremental evolution of a 
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policy, whose institutional architecture and general trajectory are molded by internal and 
external challenges posed by the EU and its environment. It is true that CFSP has so far 
failed to be a common policy, but in spite of its bitter failures and obvious inadequacies (or 
perhaps because of them), foreign and security policy has never been out of the agenda of 
European integration, and its current direction reflects its slow but nevertheless positive 
evolution. 
As this chapter illustrates, the main issue determining the speed and substance of 
security integration is the direct impact it entails, as a domain of high politics, on nation-
state sovereignty. This is the reason behind the failure of earlier attempts such as the EDC 
and the very slow evolution of the EPC to the CFSP. 
Next chapter deals with two different theories of integration and analyses the 
relevance of these theories to explain security integration in Europe. CFSP and ESDP are 
treated as case studies for the abovementioned aim.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THEORIZINIG SECURITY INTEGRATION 
 
 
 
 
There are two dominant theories of European integration: Neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism5. In this chapter, I utilize these theories and investigate their 
relevance to the CFSP/ESDP framework in order to analyze whether the development of 
security integration in Europe through the CFSP/ESDP is a product of primarily 
intergovernmental processes or supranational forces.  
Specifically, the neofunctionalist proposition is that integration initially starts with 
limited cooperation in given economic sectors and spills over to other policy areas, in time 
reaching to foreign policy and security for a complete transfer of national sovereignties to 
the EU level. Intergovernmentalists claim, on the other hand, that the integration process 
has its limits in foreign policy and security matters; reasoning that since these areas are 
located at the heart of the nation-state’s sovereignty member states will ensure that any 
transfer of competencies to the EU-level will remain under the complete jurisdiction of the 
nation-state. 
In the following pages, I first provide an overview of these established theories of 
European integration, lay out their main competing premises, and test their validity in the 
cases of CFSP and ESDP. This chapter argues that the CFSP is greatly impacted by the end 
of the Cold War which changed the preferences of the powerful actors in the EU towards 
security integration.  
                                                 
5 “By defining integration as cooperation that moves actors closer towards adopting or 
deepening supranational decision-making, one can apply existing theories of integration to 
explain how the current intergovernmental cooperation is moving EU member states 
toward eventually adopting supranational decision-making.” (Smith, Braden 2004) 
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 2.1. Established Integration Theories 
 
The gradual realization of the EU and its apparent threat to the state-centric 
theoretical constructions inevitably gave way to various accounts to make sense of this sui 
generis phenomenon, one that is “less than a federation, more than a regime” (Wallace 
1983), combining intergovernmental and supranational qualities.  
In offering different independent variables that propel the European integration 
process further, both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism attempt to coherently 
interpret the integration patterns as observed in the evolution of the EU and to provide their 
own explanations for the Member States’s surrendering parts of their sovereignty to the 
European level.  
It is true that they are often labeled (and criticized) as the ‘grand theories’ of 
European integration6, in that they seek to detail the construction, development and the 
future of the European process at large, nevertheless, because of this very aspect of attempt 
to universal applicability, they are valuable tools to be able to account for the emerging 
European polity and to comprehend the evolution of the Community into the Union.        
(Rosamond 2000) 
 
 
2.1.1. Neofunctionalism 
 
Neofunctionalism was born as an attempt to give a formal explanation to what can be 
called the ‘Monnet Method’ of integration (Rosamond 2000). This included Jean Monnet’s 
pragmatic, incremental policies of starting with specific key sectors (e.g. steel and coal) and 
then building on the success of their integration, meaning that the unified Europe 
‘…[would] not be built all at once, or as a single whole: it [would] be built by concrete 
achievements which first create de facto solidarity.’ (Tsakatika 2002) 
                                                 
6 The reason for referring to neofunctionalism as a ‘grand theory’ is contextual, that is, it is 
a result of the utilization of the concept ‘grand theory’ as restricted to the European level. 
When generalized at a higher level, neofunctionalism can only be considered as a partial 
theory.   
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As developed by Ernst Haas (1958, 1964), Leon Lindberg and Joseph Nye, the 
central focus of the theory was the European integration as a process, rather than to 
examine the necessary background conditions or the end-product of cooperation. Haas 
described this process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.” 
(Sutcliffe 1995) These political actors would be persuaded to shift there loyalties as a result 
of the positive effects of cooperation. 
Neofunctionalism tried to develop a theory of regional integration tailored for the 
European experience, drawing premises from the more universalistic functionalist approach 
to international organization. (Jupille 2002) As reflected in the works of David Mitrany, in 
a quest to deter the nationalist threat to European and world peace, functionalism had 
proposed the delegation of political authority from national to supra-national bodies, or 
‘High Institutions,’ in certain areas of technical competency such as transportation, 
agriculture and health sectors, leaving the decision-making competencies to technocrats. 
Specifically, this technical/functional cooperation would enable the “growth of new habits 
and interests” that in turn would weaken the territorial and ideological differences, leading 
to a shift of allegiance to a world community. 
Neofunctionalism developed this concept developed within the functionalist 
framework, into the notion, or rather the process, of ‘spillover.’ Lindberg described this as 
“…a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which 
the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further 
condition and a need for more action, and so forth.” (Viola 2000) To put it another way, 
spillover implies that a successful experience of integrative cooperation in areas of low 
politics where there is a minimal possibility of political contention can lead to cooperation in 
other policy areas. In addition to this ‘functional’ spillover, neofunctionalists argue that actors 
involved in integration gradually socialize into the norms of the supranational setting, 
resulting in ‘political spillover.’ With a snowball effect this cycle of integration eventually 
creeps into high politics, resulting with a transformation of political allegiances, or, at least, 
political activities of national elites to a supranational level.  
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This incremental shift of functional authority from national to supranational level, neo-
functionalists argued, could eventually result in the establishment of a central federal body. 
However, later developments in the European integration caused Haas and others to modify 
their views and admit that spillovers from economic to political sectors were not necessarily 
automatic or inevitable, and there could even be occurrences of ‘spillbacks’ (negative 
spillovers). Rather, spillover was dependent on a number of elements including national 
politics and governments as well as supra-national bodies, most importantly the European 
Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament. 
But the underlying logic of neofunctionalism remained the same: the existence of a 
universal human motive for utility maximization, regarding the Community politics 
fundamentally as a technique to realize their economic interests. Instead of grand 
ideological aspirations, first and foremost, it was the material needs that needed to be 
satisfied. (Bellami and Castiglione 200, Streeck 1997) Suitably, Haas offered that ‘[t]he 
public is ... concerned with income, price stability, better working conditions, cleaner air, 
more recreational facilities ... [and] does not greatly care whether these amenities are 
provided by national government or by Brussels.’ (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998)  
 
 
2.1.2. Intergovernmentalism 
 
As the explanatory power of neofunctionalism seemed to deteriorate due to the failure 
of supranationalism in the integration process during the 1960s, most notably with the 
nationalist resurgence led by the French President Charles de Gaulle, intergovernmentalism 
established itself as the main contender against neo-functionalism. The so-called 
intergovernmentalist backlash, first conceptualized in Stanley Hoffmann’s work (1966), 
had specific critiques against the neofunctionalist/supranationalist paradigm. 
Developing his critique from the insights of the realist tradition of international 
relations, Hoffmann emphasized the significance of the international environment as 
opposed to the neofunctionalist focus on the process, and took the central role of the 
nation-state given in the workings and evolution of the Union. The role of national 
governments was to promote the interests of their citizens in a hostile world, and it was, 
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above all, the ‘national interest’ that shaped and drove the politics of post-war Europe. In 
Hoffmann’s words these interests were to do more than the balance of power between the 
states, rather, they were “constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents and past 
experiences, and domestic forces and rulers all play a role.” (1995)  Contrary to 
neofunctionalist insistence, nation-state was obstinate rather than obsolete. 
Another critique was targeted to the ‘Monnet method’ of integration. Specifically, it 
was argued, the neofunctionalist logic of integration that assumed automatic and 
unintended spill-over was flawed. Since national governments had prioritized issues of 
integration, in certain matters they were expected to be less willing to be compensated for 
their losses by gains in other areas, and they would want to retain their control over the 
decision-making procedures when they felt there were vital interests at stake. (Cram 1996) 
Hoffmann maintained that functional integration could have plausible success only if it 
“had sufficient potency to promise an excess of gains over losses… Theoretically, this may 
be true of economic integration. It is not true of political integration (in the sense of ‘high 
politics’).” (1966) This distinction between ‘high politics’ (foreign policy, security, defense 
policies) and ‘low politics’ (economic and welfare policies) was central to the critique of 
neofunctional/supranational approach. In the latter, issues were mainly of technocratic 
nature and states were willing to cooperate and integrate. But in the realm of high politics, 
where national identities and autonomy of the governments were perceived to be at stake, 
they were not prepared to compromise their sovereignty.  Hoffman argued that the 
functional integration brought about by the expansion of tasks carried an increasing amount 
of uncertainty regarding the end result of the project. In the face of uncertainty, national 
governments were bound to get in conflict with each other because they derived their 
interests from different bases. So, because “nations preferred the certainty, or the self-
controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, over the uncontrolled uncertainty of the 
untested blender,” the area of high politics was resistant to integrative forces. (Rosamond 
2000) 
As a reformulation of this approach, ‘liberal intergovernmentalism,’ formulated by 
Moravscik (1991, 1993) adds domestic politics within the nation-state dynamics as the 
independent variable, where the former constrains the actions and the autonomy of the 
latter. Moravscik develops his case by analyzing the negotiations of the SEA and argues 
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that it was the interstate bargains between France, Germany and Britain that determined the 
outcome of the negotiations. Moreover, the eventual outcomes were “the lowest common 
denominator” solutions and they were possible only because of the convergence of national 
interests at certain points. (Moravscik 1991) His reformulation includes a two-level 
analysis, where the national government links the domestic and international levels. The 
preferences of member states, which determine their positions in EU-level negotiations, are 
in turn determined by domestic societal factors. But domestic forces do not simply have a 
dynamic of their own, national preferences also reflect ‘security externalities,’ major 
geopolitical events that reveal new information to the players. So, in Moravscik’s words 
“state behavior reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by 
domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment.” (1993) 
Here, too, the integration process does not need to lead to the weakening of the 
nation-state. On the contrary, because the governments can take the controversial issues 
away from domestic politics, into the higher level of executive control, it may as well result 
in a stronger state in the face of the supranational threat. (Risse-Kappen 1996)  
With these points in mind, the intergovernmentalists see the EU, as an example of 
“international organizations,” to be a creation to serve the purposes of the Member States, 
and its legitimacy lies in the agreement of national governments. The central dynamic of 
the integration (or its prevention), for intergovernmentalists, is ‘inter-state bargaining,’ 
which includes the interaction of the interests, relative bargaining powers, and bargaining 
strategies of these sovereign states. (Scharpf 2000) Through creation of various 
supranational institutions as a judiciary or a bureaucracy, the Member States are able to 
enforce and employ collective agreements so long as their interests overlap. The trick is 
that the supranational level is never allowed to be autonomous from the powers of the 
states. Where “neofunctionalism emphasizes the active role of supranational officials in 
shaping bargaining outcomes, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive 
institutions and the autonomy of national leaders.” (Moravscik 1993) Therefore, through 
the employment of various EU institutions such as the Council of Ministers, or the 
European Council, Member States pursue their own national interests. (Marks, Hooghe, 
Blank 1996) Naturally, this mechanism prevents the possibility of a federal body in the 
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future of Europe, and the hegemony of the sovereign nation-state in international relations 
does not dissolve.  
 
 
2.2. Testing the Theories on Security Integration 
 
In the light of the outlined points of the two integration theories, the evolution of 
CFSP can be explained in two different ways, one taking the predominance of 
supranational entities, the other the nation-state as the main determinant of integration in 
foreign and security policy. Utilization of a neofunctional/supranational approach could 
explain the development of CFSP structures as an unintended consequence of spillover 
from previous integration in related but separate areas. So once governments delegate 
powers to the EU institutions, such as with the inception of the Single Market, an 
irreversible momentum is created aided by creation of transnational elite not committed to 
national forms of allegiance, that leads to a monetary union, in turn, paving the way to a 
political union with a complete transfer of loyalties to the EU. Giving the Commission a 
central role in setting the integration agenda, a neofunctionalist approach would hold that 
with every IGC, integration progressively expands through inclusion of new issues, 
eventually covering all of the functions of the nation-state. 
An intergovernmental explanation on the other hand, would treat CFSP as an entity 
designed to specifically improve the specific aspects of a common foreign and security 
policy useful to national interests, eliminating the need for the investigation of other policy 
areas. In this approach, because as rational and instrumental actors national governments 
face far less pressure from domestic actors to delegate/pool their sovereignty in foreign 
policy areas related to defense and security matters (as opposed to economic or trade 
policies), they are more averse to deepening of integration in high politics. Following this 
logic, member states can consider pooling their sovereignty only when their respective 
national interests converge to such a point that perceived gains of integration compensate 
for the loss of national sovereignty. Failing to find such a convergence prevents a complete 
transfer of the right to exercise sovereignty to supranational institution, and any bargaining 
process represents the lowest common denominator of national interests. 
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So, in order to investigate the proposition that “intergovernmentalism explains 
security integration through the CFSP/ESDP by focusing on the member state preferences 
and the bargaining processes between them,” I argue that an investigation of the validity of 
the below conditions are necessary:  
 
Profound leaps in security/defense integration occur only when: 
1- National preferences, determined by domestic/national priorities, converge 
sufficiently so that the perceived gains from integration compensate for sharing or losing 
national sovereignty, 
2- Governments face domestic pressure to shift their preferences; which could be a 
result of security externalities, or 
3- The bargaining process results in agreements/institutional arrangements reflecting 
the lowest common denominator of national preferences; and for those states with 
diverging interests, protecting opt-out/flexibility etc. arrangements are included. 
 
These three statements are chosen because they reflect major and discernible dividing 
lines between intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist/supranationalist approaches. 
(Gordon 1998) 
Verification of these conditions will result in the affirmation of the primacy of state-
centered over the Union-centered accounts in explaining the development of the CFSP.  
In analyzing the above statements, I will investigate the three instances of 
intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) that are all ratified by the member states and that can 
be regarded as the milestones in the history of the foreign and security policy integration 
because of their concrete implications: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992), introducing the 
CFSP for the first time in the institutional structure of the EU; the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997), convened partly to evaluate and strengthen the CFSP; and the Treaty of Nice 
(2000), as the formalization of the so-called St Malo process culminating in the ESDP. 
But before looking at the specific cases, it is important to lay down the positions and 
preferences of the three major actors of European integration, since their interests are 
continuously reflected in the intergovernmental bargaining over the CFSP. 
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 2.2.1. National Interests of Major Actors 
 
The intergovernmentalist approach would argue that Britain, France and Germany, as 
the most powerful players in the Community, shape the development of the CFSP and this 
section analyses the preferences of these three key actors. (Keohane, Nye and Hoffman 
1993, Pedersen 1998, Tiersky, 2004) 
In the case of Britain, the central element for British attitude towards European 
integration had customarily been independence. This could be attributed to several factors. 
One was a “delusion of grandeur” about Britain’s role in the world. But this self-image also 
had tangible bases. As part of the winning side of the World War II, Britain was a chief 
architect of the post-War European order and a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council. During the Cold-War, through its legacy of empire, the Commonwealth ties, 
tradition of diplomacy, ‘special relations’ with the United States and independent nuclear 
force, Britain had managed to play a greater role in international arena than its power 
position would suggest and could fall back on an independent foreign policy. The British 
perception of being a (ex)great power isolated from the rest of the continent, also led to a 
lack of social and cultural affinity with the integration process on the part of the public and 
political leadership, such that these two are much closer together in their attitudes than is 
probably the case in other member states. (Mahncke 1993) Consequently, Britain was an 
“awkward partner,” not the most prone to European integration of any sort, let alone in high 
politics. (George 1998) This attitude was crystallized in defining the British interests in the 
EU as the preservation of national sovereignty and full power of member states. 
Specifically, this preference led to a strong inclination to retain the right to veto through the 
unanimity rules as opposed to expansion of QMV in foreign and security policy 
cooperation. 
On defense issues, Britain traditionally supported reliance on NATO in assuring 
European security. Since the British attached a high value to transatlantic bond, both on a 
sentimental level and because of a more direct national interest from the special 
relationship with the leading economic and military power, they regarded NATO as a 
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means for ensuring the commitment of the United States to European defense even in the 
post-Cold War era.  
France, arguably, the most influential of all three states in the development of the EU, 
was another state with aspirations to be a great power. It was also a member of the 
victorious side of the war and had a permanent seat in the Security Council, along with an 
independent nuclear capacity and, hence, had leverage for a viable unilateral foreign policy. 
But, unlike Britain, its national interests lied firmly in investing in the European 
integration, not least because of its direct experiences with the “German problem.” 
Although a leitmotif of European integration in general, keeping the German power under 
control and maintaining the French influence was a bigger priority for France than it was 
for Britain since it was the former who were defeated and occupied by German forces 
during World War II and had to find a way to live together, hence a need for reconciliation.  
In any case, their insistence on integration had for the most part to do with de Gaulle 
setting the tone of French politics by reviving an old sense of national identity. In this 
context, the central element for France in conducting European affairs was pre-eminence. 
The French position showed the prevalence of the Gaullist legacy of seeing the Community 
as a means to enhance French resources and influence in world politics while securing 
control over the community structures via the European Council. Put in other way, France 
would use the European integration to transcend its middle-power position into a great-
power in international affairs through leverage of the EU.  
The French insistence on distinction between high and low politics and on 
intergovernmentalism, embodied in the conception of ‘l’Europe des Patries,’ coupled with 
the need to anchor Germany securely in the European system meant that France would be 
willing to opt for deeper integration in areas where Germany had a clear advantage (e.g. 
economic union) that called for the need to balance and control German strength, but would 
otherwise want to preserve her control over the Community decisions by guarding French 
predominance in the Commission. These French preferences resulted in a dual approach of 
both preserving unanimity and national veto in important decisions when national interests 
were at stake but also actively seeking coalitions to drive the integration process further, 
including the foreign and security policy cooperation. (Caporaso 2000) 
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A further element of the legacy of de Gaulle also included a rejection of Anglo-Saxon 
hegemony, most evident in the French outlook to defense matters. Traditionally suspicious 
of American involvement in European security, French disapproval of American security 
leadership resulted in a problematic relationship with NATO. Formally arguing that the 
American hegemony was inhibiting the Europeans from defending their own interests and 
hence achieving unity, France actively sought the revival of WEU as an autonomous entity 
from NATO, answerable only to the EU. (Mahncke 1996)    
Lastly, Germany was both a rationale and, together with France, a source of European 
integration. But unlike France, or Britain, it did not posses the means (as a defeated country 
Germany lacked independent military capability, let alone nuclear force, or a seat in the UN 
Security Council) to pursue a unilateral foreign policy. At the end of the war Germany was 
a semi-sovereign and divided state and in order to be reaccepted into the international scene 
as a legitimate actor, it had to build up a “capital of trust.” (Pedersen 1998) This meant an 
apparent need for the perpetual manifestation of willingness to share power and sovereignty 
on the part of the German public and elite, which coincided with the post-war 
reconstruction of Europe with the twin structure of the EC and NATO as envisioned by the 
Allies. The German insecurity was so strong that, they often tried to identify their national 
interests as merging with that of the Europe, such that their “national interests were always 
to be … covered … by curtains marked ‘Europe’, ‘peace’, [and] ‘cooperation’…” 
(Pedersen 1998) 
These post-war national interests of Germany were, for the most part, crystallized by 
the leadership of Adenauer, in a similar vein to the Gaullist predisposition of France. His 
legacy positioned Germany as completely loyal to the Western alliance and European 
integration. It also regarded the United States as a trusted and indispensable ally fulfilling 
the essential German security needs emerging from the proximity to the Soviet threat that 
Germany alone could not realize under the anxious and watchful eyes of its Western 
neighbors. These preferences culminated in a strong and, in principle, unqualified German 
commitment to the construction of a supranational European system, as reflected by the 
German constitution’s explicit authorization of the “transfer [of] sovereign powers to 
intergovernmental institutions,” (Welsh 2004) while refraining from actively pursuing 
leadership in areas with direct military implications. The reflection of these inclinations on 
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foreign and security policy was a consistent preference for QMV instead of unanimity 
rules, whereas in defense matters the conviction of the need for American involvement 
often put Germany as an arbitrator between France and Britain. 
 
 
2.2.2. 1990 IGC and the Maastricht Treaty 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, the construction of the CFSP as part of the new 
EU is widely seen as a reaction to the perceived inadequacy of the existing informal EPC 
machinery in dealing with the historic transformations Europe faced at the end of the 
1980s. The European security climate had been completely altered both with the prospect 
of a reunited Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact after the 1989 revolution. 
Gone was the Soviet military threat to Western Europe, which had long shaped the security 
architecture built strictly around NATO. It was in this setting that a joint Franco-German 
proposal opened the discussion of the political aspects of European integration. But, in the 
end, the disintegration of the simpler bipolar world in which national positions were placed 
under the overarching cloak of the Western block helped the reaffirmation of the division of 
foreign policy priorities of the European powers. 
 
 
National Positions and Outcomes 
 
During the negotiations, the bargaining positions of the three major actors regarding 
foreign policy and security cooperation were in line with their national preferences. 
On the question of the formation of a common foreign policy, the national 
governments were divided into two camps. Germany, along with the Benelux countries, 
Italy and the Commission argued for an authentic common foreign policy embedded fully 
within the Community structures. Britain, on the other hand, led Denmark and Portugal, 
favoring foreign policy cooperation on existing intergovernmental lines of the EPC. France 
aligned with the British to propose a three-pillar structure that strictly limited the role of the 
Community institutions regarding foreign policy, as well as internal affairs, in favor of the 
Council. Here, the traditional French insistence of national sovereignty was reinforced 
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against the prospects of a reunified Germany as a restored great power, or as Europe’s 
“alternative hegemon.” This, in turn, paved the way for an Anglo-French alliance, who with 
viable unilateral polices, nuclear weapons, and seats in the UN Security Council opposed a 
strong common policy with supranational institutions championed by Germany. 
(Moravcsik 1998) 
In defense policy, the camps were divided between the ‘Atlanticists’ and the 
‘Europeanists.’ As expected, Britain led the pro-NATO camp of the Netherlands and 
Portugal to organize the WEU as subordinate to NATO; where France, backed by the 
Commission with the equivocal support of Germany, opted instead for the WEU to be a 
more direct alternative to NATO, answerable to the EU instead. The ambiguity of Germans 
was also understandable since their priorities lied not only in the strengthening of the EU 
but the preservation of the transatlantic alliance. 
These diverging positions on the foreign and defense policies once again showed that 
the French take on what ‘political union’ stood for differentiated from the German 
interpretation. Where the former envisaged a more confederal structure dealing with foreign 
policy and security matters, the latter saw it as a means to strengthen Community 
competence with the expansion of QMV.  
The outcome of the negotiations culminating in the TEU, as detailed in the previous 
chapter, favored the three-pillar structure (temple) as opposed to a single community 
framework (tree); opted strongly in favor of unanimity over QMV, with no formal role for 
the Commission; and refrained from a formal institutional linkage between WEU and the 
EU. Moreover, during the troubled ratification processes Denmark was granted a de facto 
opt-out from involvement in the implementation of foreign policy and defense decisions. 
So in the end Maastricht provisions clearly showed that the political transformations 
in Europe could not provide adequate reasons for the Member States to change their 
traditional national perspectives, if not providing new reasons (not least the German 
unification) to stick with their existing priorities. As a result, the long-established national 
preferences of the three major actors of European integration, Germany, France and Britain, 
prevailed. And in the absence of convergence of interests that would rationalize for the 
national governments loosing or even sharing of sovereignty, any integration in foreign and 
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security policy was a consequence of the bargaining process resulting in a lowest common 
denominator agreement. 
 
2.2.3. 1996 IGC and the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
The 1996 IGC was originally committed to by the member states as a revision of the 
Maastricht Treaty primarily in areas of security and defense,7 and convened at a time when 
the post-Cold War euphoria was swiftly waning and in mind with the disappointing track 
record of the CFSP most prominent in failing to come up with a common policy for dealing 
with the issues even at its backyard, most notably with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
The 1995 reports prepared by the Council, Commission and Parliament all acknowledged 
that the pillar structure was not functioning well, with the Commission specifically advising 
for a simplification of the institutional structure, highlighting the need for CFSP reform. 
 
 
National Positions and Outcomes 
 
For the most part, the negotiations were centered on issues similar to the 1990 IGC. 
The positions of member states during negotiations leading to the Amsterdam Treaty 
showed, more than anything, the persistence of national preferences even in the light of 
dissatisfying results that the previously agreed institutional framework of the CFSP 
brought. (Moravscik and Nikolaidis 1999)  
On foreign policy discussions Germany, backed by the Commission, continued its 
support for a deeper binding common foreign policy structure. To this end, it advocated a 
greater reliance on QMV for crucial foreign policy decisions and was officially supported 
by all EU governments except Britain, Denmark, Portugal and the traditionally neutral 
1995 entrants Sweden and Finland. Still, the French support to QMV was qualified in that 
they were only willing to expand its use in foreign policy as long as they could avoid 
putting national interests at stake. To this end, France promoted reweighting Council votes 
                                                 
7 “The calling of the IGC itself reflected the national interests of those governments 
dissatisfied with the Maastricht agreement” (Moravscik, 1999) 
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so that they would have greater veto power if they wanted to prevent common action. 
(Caporaso 2000)  
On defense negotiations, France once again led the pro-European camp for the 
deepening of WEU integration with the Union. Naturally, Atlanticists governments headed 
by Britain and the Netherlands resisted any defense integration autonomous of NATO 
structures. The new neutral members once again backed the British side in opposing the 
communitarization of defense policy, although their reasons differed with them. 
But, on the whole, there was a general consensus among the powerful member states 
in the wake of the Bosnian experience on the need to find ways to avoid the vetoes of 
neutral countries in cases where they would want to act.  
Still, the abovementioned national positions proved that the Yugoslav debacle did not 
reflect the same way with EU governments so as to provide for a shift in their respective 
preferences. Once again in the absence of any convergence of member state interests or of 
domestic pressure, the outcomes of the negotiations characterized lowest common 
denominator agreements that were extremely limited in substance. So, as detailed in the 
first chapter, while the end bargain extended QMV, included “constructive abstention” and 
“enhanced co-operation” for those more activist member states, every EU government 
retained the right to veto in the European Council at the triggering stage of strategies, 
effectively maintaining control over the decision. This extension of QMV, in requiring a de 
facto unanimity, represented not more than an illusion of strengthening the Community 
method. As for the defense issues, the compromise was such that a future WEU-EU linkage 
could be agreed upon without the need to convene another IGC as long as it was 
unanimously decided by the member states. Additionally, future military operations under 
the EU umbrella would be limited to the peace-keeping realm (Petersberg Tasks), a 
decision to assuage the Nordic neutrals. 
 
 
2.2.4. 2000 IGC and the Nice Treaty 
 
Although the 2000 IGC was mainly concerned about preparing the EU to 
enlargement, in the context of our discussion the Nice Treaty is significant in that it 
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concluded the 1998’s St Malo initiative with the finalization of the agreement of member 
states on forging the ESDP. This was in and of itself a big step in CFSP integration, since 
its defense aspects had formerly faced a vehement British opposition stemming from their 
national interests. So, for our proposes it is more appropriate to investigate the motives 
behind the larger St Malo  process starting an EU-centred joint defense initiative that 
eventually culminated in the adoption of the French Presidency Report on ESDP during the 
Nice Summit. 
 
National Positions and Outcomes 
 
In the two previous cases of 1990 and 1996 IGCs, external security events had very 
little influence over the member state preferences, failing to provide neither a convergence 
of national interests or exert domestic pressure to national governments to respond. But a 
conglomeration of factors led to a sea change in Britain, where any agenda of “autonomous 
action” outside the framework of NATO had once been a big no-no for their national 
interests, enabling the reappearance of defense integration on the EU menu. These factors 
were the government change, Kosovo war and public opinion.  
Ending the eighteen years of uninterrupted Conservative government that fostered a 
strong Euroscepticism among its ranks, the new Labor government in Britain was the main 
actor of the transformation. Their party programme espoused a more constructive role 
towards the EU than the Tories while sustaining the national intergovernmentalist vision. In 
trying to reconcile the traditional British interests with the European integration process, 
they advocated the view that there was no need to make a definite choice between being 
European and being the closest ally of the US. (Gyarmati and Mathiopoulos 1999)  In 
addition to the new government’s priorities, the contrasting views of the British and the 
Americans on the Kosovo conflict and the strong shift of British public opinion in favor of 
taking military measures against the Belgrade government’s provocations were the 
determinants of the British move. More specifically, the Kosovo incident did not just reveal 
the extent of military and leadership difference between the US and the Europeans; it also 
showed that the US and British interests did not necessarily overlap. Where the lessons 
drawn from the collective inability of the EU in the Bosnia episode were still fresh for the 
British, Kosovo was more of a “derivative interest,” and another military and fiscal burden 
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for the US, igniting discussions in the US Congress over how to get the European allies to 
engage in more burden-sharing. (Pond 1999) Consequently, the US was very reluctant to 
deploy ground forces in the region in contrast to the willingness of the British to do so.  
In the end, the British concern over a possible US withdrawal from European defense 
and disillusionment with the unilateral US policy towards Serbia coupled with a climate in 
which the British public and political elite became more receptive to the idea of common 
defense just as did the rest of Europe,8 catered the St Malo process.  
The main motivation behind St Malo, then, was an attempt to narrow the 
“capabilities-expectations gap,” (Hill 1993) in a situation where there was a desire to act 
that was hindered by the EU’s lack of joint capabilities. 
The ESDP was the outcome of the process, formalized and substantiated through 
subsequent European Council meetings and the Nice Treaty, as detailed in the previous 
chapter, and with concrete implications like setting up of the RRF independent of NATO 
and the effective integration of WEU’s security and defense functions into EU institutions, 
it showed the British willingness to accept an autonomous European military capacity.  
This episode displays that the drive towards integration was, as opposed to the 
previous two cases, stemming from domestic dynamics interacting with external security 
events. It was once again true that the underlying national interests had not converged, so 
ESDP was conceived within a strictly intergovernmental decision-making framework, but it 
was also more than a lowest common denominator agreement breaking the previous pattern 
of deadlock in defense integration.  
 
 
2.3. Conclusions 
 
The evaluation of the 1990, 1996 and 2000 IGCs reveals that in neither of the cases 
was there any meaningful convergence of national interests in foreign and security policies 
that would compensate for the loss or even pooling of sovereignty among member states. 
An intergovernmentalist explanation would suggest that, in the absence of such 
convergence, any integration in these areas is either as a result of domestic pressures on 
                                                 
8 It was claimed that “there are no neutrals any more.” (Pond 1999) 
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national governments, or a result of interstate bargaining with the outcome reflecting the 
lowest common denominator of national preferences. And since ‘high politics’ are not the 
usual domains of domestic conflicts, it is often the case that lowest common denominator 
agreements drive the security/defense integration. Indeed, both the 1990 and 1996 cases 
reveal the perseverance of lowest common denominator agreements, while the last case 
exposes the effect of domestic politics and pressure paving the way for a change in 
government preferences. 
In the end, even the fact that 1990 and 1996 IGCs raised nearly identical issues with 
similar modest outcomes illustrates the predominance of stable national preferences over 
spillover effects of prior integration, devaluing a primarily neofunctionalist account of 
foreign policy and security integration. All three examples support, on the other hand, the 
premises of the state-centric approach, enabling us to conclude intergovernmentalism as the 
predominant explanation of the CFSP integration. 
Next chapter deals with public opinion and its impact on security integration. More 
specifically, it seeks to find whether the intergovernmentalist explanation is still valid if the 
preferences of the domestic public are taken into account.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
PUBLIC OPINION AND SECURITY INTEGRATION 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the evolution of the CFSP/ESDP could be 
most appropriately explained by intergovernmentalism. A notable expectation of 
intergovernmentalism is that although national preferences in the areas of ‘low politics’ are 
susceptible to change as a result of domestic bargaining (involving the political elite, 
interest groups and public), public opinion is not a significant variable influencing member 
state preference formation in foreign policy and defense integration. The rationalization 
here is that since these areas are somewhat removed from people’s daily lives, it is expected 
that national governments do not face substantial pressure from the public to the extent that 
they are compelled to re-evaluate national interests. On the contrary, because of the nature 
of these issues governments are relatively autonomous from public opinion and have 
greater room to maneuver. In short, unless public priorities are altered by externalities such 
that foreign and security policy concerns increase, national preferences are not substantially 
affected by public opinion.  
In the following pages, Eurobarometer data9 will be analyzed in order to investigate 
this assumption, that is to see whether there exists a pattern between public opinion and 
national positions, and, in particular, whether shifts in public opinion are reflected in the 
actual CFSP/ESDP integration. Following the previous chapter’s model, the countries are 
restricted to Britain, France and Germany along with the EU-15 aggregates. 
                                                 
9 Eurobarometer public opinion surveys (standard Eurobarometer surveys), available at 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm> 
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3.1. Support for EU Membership10
 
Figure 3.1 EU-wide support for EU membership 
 
 
Table 3.1 EU-wide support for EU membership 
EU AGGREGATE A good thing A bad thing Neither good nor bad Don't Know 
EB38.0 60.00 12.00 22.00 5.00 
EB39.0 60.00 12.00 23.00 5.00 
EB40 57.00 13.00 25.00 5.00 
EB41.0 54.00 12.00 28.00 5.00 
EB42 58.00 12.00 24.00 5.00 
EB43.0 56.00 12.00 25.00 6.00 
EB44.2 53.00 13.00 28.00 6.00 
EB45.1 48.00 15.00 28.00 9.00 
EB46.0 48.00 17.00 28.00 8.00 
EB47.1 46.00 15.00 30.00 9.00 
EB48.0 49.00 14.00 28.00 8.00 
EB49 51.00 12.00 28.00 8.00 
EB50.0 54.00 12.00 26.00 8.00 
EB51.0 48.00 12.00 27.00 12.00 
EB52.0 50.00 12.00 27.00 12.00 
EB53 49.00 14.00 27.00 9.00 
EB54.1 50.00 14.00 27.00 9.00 
EB55.1 48.00 13.00 29.00 10.00 
EB56.2 53.00 12.00 28.00 7.00 
EB57.1 53.00 11.00 28.00 8.00 
EB61 48.00 17.00 29.00 6.00 
                                                 
10 The exact wording of the question is: “Generally speaking, do you think that (your 
country''s) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is ...?” Available 
data compiled from the period: October 1992 (EB38.0) To April 2004 (EB61) 
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Figure 3.2 British support for EU membership  
 
 
 
Table 3.2 British support for EU membership 
BRITAIN A good thing A bad thing Neither good nor bad Don't  Know 
     
EB38.0 43.00 24.00 24.00 8.00 
EB39.0 47.00 22.00 25.00 5.00 
EB40 42.00 22.00 30.00 5.00 
EB41.0 43.00 21.00 29.00 7.00 
EB42 43.00 22.00 28.00 6.00 
EB43.0 44.00 20.00 31.00 5.00 
EB44.2 41.00 21.00 30.00 8.00 
EB45.1 35.00 26.00 27.00 13.00 
EB46.0 35.00 28.00 25.00 11.00 
EB47.1 35.00 26.00 27.00 11.00 
EB48.0 36.00 23.00 29.00 13.00 
EB49 41.00 19.00 30.00 11.00 
EB50.0 37.00 22.00 29.00 12.00 
EB51.0 31.00 23.00 26.00 20.00 
EB52.0 29.00 24.00 28.00 19.00 
EB53 25.00 24.00 29.00 22.00 
EB54.1 28.00 22.00 29.00 20.00 
EB55.1 29.00 24.00 27.00 20.00 
EB56.2 33.00 22.00 31.00 14.00 
EB57.1 32.00 21.00 32.00 15.00 
EB61 29.00 29.00 29.00 13.00 
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Figure 3.3 German support for EU membership 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 German support for EU membership 
GERMANY A good thing A bad thing Neither good nor bad Don't  Know 
     
EB38.0 60.00 10.00 24.00 5.00 
EB39.0 58.00 10.00 26.00 5.00 
EB40 53.00 12.00 29.00 5.00 
EB41.0 50.00 12.00 33.00 5.00 
EB42 61.00 10.00 25.00 4.00 
EB43.0 60.00 8.00 24.00 8.00 
EB44.2 46.00 12.00 35.00 7.00 
EB45.1 39.00 13.00 36.00 11.00 
EB46.0 39.00 16.00 37.00 8.00 
EB47.1 36.00 15.00 37.00 11.00 
EB48.0 38.00 15.00 37.00 10.00 
EB49 41.00 13.00 36.00 10.00 
EB50.0 48.00 11.00 30.00 10.00 
EB51.0 44.00 10.00 30.00 13.00 
EB52.0 47.00 12.00 30.00 10.00 
EB53 41.00 15.00 33.00 11.00 
EB54.1 48.00 14.00 30.00 8.00 
EB55.1 45.00 11.00 34.00 11.00 
EB56.2 54.00 11.00 28.00 7.00 
EB57.1 52.00 9.00 31.00 9.00 
EB61 45.00 14.00 35.00 7.00 
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Figure 3.4 French support for EU membership 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 French support for EU membership
FRANCE  A good thing A bad thing Neither good nor bad Don't Know 
      
EB38.0  57.00 12.00 27.00 3.00 
EB39.0  56.00 13.00 27.00 4.00 
EB40  55.00 14.00 26.00 5.00 
EB41.0  50.00 13.00 33.00 4.00 
EB42  58.00 12.00 27.00 3.00 
EB43.0  52.00 12.00 30.00 5.00 
EB44.2  53.00 13.00 29.00 4.00 
EB45.1  48.00 14.00 33.00 5.00 
EB46.0  46.00 19.00 31.00 4.00 
EB47.1  47.00 12.00 36.00 4.00 
EB48.0  48.00 13.00 33.00 5.00 
EB49  50.00 13.00 30.00 7.00 
EB50.0  52.00 12.00 30.00 6.00 
EB51.0  47.00 14.00 30.00 9.00 
EB52.0  47.00 16.00 30.00 7.00 
EB53  49.00 14.00 32.00 5.00 
EB54.1  48.00 15.00 31.00 6.00 
EB55.1  49.00 12.00 33.00 6.00 
EB56.2  50.00 13.00 34.00 3.00 
EB57.1  47.00 14.00 35.00 5.00 
EB61  43.00 18.00 35.00 3.00 
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3.2. Support for CFSP11
 
Figure 3.5 EU-wide support for CFSP 
 
 
Table 3.5. EU-wide support for CFSP 
EU AGGREGATES  For Against Don't Know 
     
EB38.0  68.00 17.00 15.00 
EB39.0  66.00 19.00 15.00 
EB40  69.00 17.00 14.00 
EB41.0  68.00 17.00 15.00 
EB42  70.00 17.00 13.00 
EB43.1  66.00 18.00 16.00 
EB44.1  69.00 17.00 14.00 
EB44.2  66.00 19.00 15.00 
EB46.0  64.00 22.00 14.00 
EB47.1  63.00 20.00 16.00 
EB48.0  63.00 21.00 16.00 
EB49  63.00 16.00 20.00 
EB50.0  66.00 16.00 18.00 
EB51.0  63.00 16.00 21.00 
EB52.0  64.00 17.00 18.00 
EB53  64.00 17.00 19.00 
EB55.1  65.00 18.00 18.00 
EB56.2  66.00 20.00 14.00 
EB61  65.00 22.00 13.00 
                                                 
11 The exact wording of the question is: “Irrespective of other details of the Maastricht Treaty, what is your 
opinion on each of the following proposals? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against 
it. (Subquestion: One common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union, towards other 
countries.”) Available data compiled from the period: October 1992 (EB38.0) - April 2004 (EB61) 
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Figure 3.6 British  support for CFSP 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 British  support for CFSP 
BRITAIN  For Against Don't  Know 
     
EB38.0  55.00 30.00 15.00 
EB39.0  53.00 31.00 15.00 
EB40  58.00 24.00 17.00 
EB41.0  55.00 28.00 16.00 
EB42  56.00 26.00 17.00 
EB43.1  56.00 28.00 15.00 
EB44.1  58.00 27.00 14.00 
EB44.2  51.00 32.00 17.00 
EB46.0  46.00 40.00 13.00 
EB47.1  43.00 35.00 22.00 
EB48.0  41.00 40.00 19.00 
EB49  49.00 26.00 25.00 
EB50.0  52.00 24.00 24.00 
EB51.0  43.00 25.00 32.00 
EB52.0  41.00 28.00 31.00 
EB53  40.00 29.00 31.00 
EB55.1  38.00 34.00 28.00 
EB56.2  40.00 35.00 25.00 
EB61  39.00 39.00 22.00 
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Figure 3.7 German support for CFSP 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 German support for CFSP 
GERMANY  For Against Don't Know 
     
EB38.0  75.00 13.00 12.00 
EB39.0  70.00 17.00 12.00 
EB40  73.00 16.00 11.00 
EB41.0  72.00 17.00 10.00 
EB42  75.00 17.00 7.00 
EB43.1  70.00 16.00 13.00 
EB44.1  72.00 16.00 12.00 
EB44.2  71.00 17.00 12.00 
EB46.0  68.00 19.00 12.00 
EB47.1  66.00 18.00 15.00 
EB48.0  67.00 17.00 16.00 
EB49  66.00 14.00 19.00 
EB50.0  70.00 13.00 16.00 
EB51.0  68.00 13.00 18.00 
EB52.0  71.00 13.00 16.00 
EB53  69.00 14.00 16.00 
EB55.1  70.00 12.00 17.00 
EB56.2  74.00 16.00 10.00 
EB61  74.00 16.00 9.00 
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Figure 3.8 French support for CFSP 
 
 
 
Table 3.8 French support for CFSP 
FRANCE  For Against Don't Know 
     
EB38.0  70.00 17.00 12.00 
EB39.0  67.00 21.00 12.00 
EB40  70.00 19.00 11.00 
EB41.0  72.00 15.00 12.00 
EB42  71.00 17.00 11.00 
EB43.1  70.00 19.00 11.00 
EB44.1  76.00 14.00 10.00 
EB44.2  69.00 18.00 12.00 
EB46.0  69.00 22.00 9.00 
EB47.1  69.00 19.00 12.00 
EB48.0  74.00 17.00 9.00 
EB49  70.00 15.00 14.00 
EB50.0  71.00 17.00 12.00 
EB51.0  67.00 15.00 18.00 
EB52.0  65.00 23.00 12.00 
EB53  70.00 15.00 14.00 
EB55.1  74.00 15.00 10.00 
EB56.2  62.00 28.00 10.00 
EB61  66.00 22.00 12.00 
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3.3. Support for ESDP12
 
Figure 3.9 EU-wide support for ESDP 
 
 
Table 3.9 EU-wide support for ESDP 
EU-AGGREGATE  For Against Don't Know 
     
EB38.0  76.00 14.00 10.00 
EB39.0  77.00 13.00 10.00 
EB40  77.00 14.00 9.00 
EB41.0  75.00 15.00 9.00 
EB42  79.00 11.00 9.00 
EB43.1  75.00 13.00 12.00 
EB44.1  73.00 16.00 11.00 
EB44.2  60.00 26.00 14.00 
EB46.0  68.00 20.00 11.00 
EB47.1  68.00 19.00 13.00 
EB48.0  69.00 19.00 12.00 
EB49  73.00 14.00 14.00 
EB50.0  75.00 13.00 12.00 
EB51.0  70.00 14.00 16.00 
EB52.0  73.00 14.00 13.00 
EB53  72.00 14.00 14.00 
EB56.2  73.00 17.00 11.00 
EB61  72.00 16.00 11.00 
                                                 
12 The exact wording of the question is: “Irrespective of other details of the Maastricht 
Treaty, what is your opinion on each of the following proposals? Please tell me for each 
proposal, whether you are for it or against it. (Subquestion: A common defense and 
security/military policy among the European Union member states.) Available data 
compiled from the period: October 1992 (EB38.0) - April 2004 (EB61) 
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Figure 3.10 British support for ESDP 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.10 British  support for ESDP 
BRITAIN  For Against Don't Know 
     
EB38.0  70.00 19.00 11.00 
EB39.0  77.00 15.00 7.00 
EB40  74.00 17.00 8.00 
EB41.0  70.00 20.00 10.00 
EB42  76.00 13.00 11.00 
EB43.1  79.00 14.00 7.00 
EB44.1  68.00 22.00 8.00 
EB44.2  48.00 38.00 14.00 
EB46.0  61.00 27.00 11.00 
EB47.1  57.00 26.00 16.00 
EB48.0  57.00 28.00 15.00 
EB49  61.00 21.00 17.00 
EB50.0  63.00 21.00 15.00 
EB51.0  58.00 19.00 23.00 
EB52.0  56.00 23.00 21.00 
EB53  49.00 26.00 25.00 
EB55.1  51.00 25.00 24.00 
EB56.2  53.00 27.00 20.00 
EB61  52.00 28.00 20.00 
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Figure 3.11 German support for ESDP 
 
 
 
Table 3.11 German support for ESDP 
GERMANY  For Against Don't Know 
     
EB38.0  81.00 12.00 7.00 
EB39.0  79.00 12.00 9.00 
EB40  82.00 11.00 7.00 
EB41.0  81.00 13.00 5.00 
EB42  84.00 11.00 4.00 
EB43.1  76.00 12.00 11.00 
EB44.1  79.00 11.00 9.00 
EB44.2  70.00 18.00 12.00 
EB46.0  75.00 16.00 9.00 
EB47.1  74.00 14.00 11.00 
EB48.0  76.00 13.00 11.00 
EB49  74.00 13.00 12.00 
EB50.0  79.00 9.00 11.00 
EB51.0  74.00 12.00 14.00 
EB52.0  76.00 12.00 12.00 
EB53  76.00 12.00 12.00 
EB55.1  79.00 9.00 11.00 
EB56.2  78.00 14.00 8.00 
EB61  80.00 12.00 8.00 
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Figure 3.12 French support for ESDP 
 
 
 
Table 3.12 French support for ESDP 
FRANCE  For Against Don't Know 
     
EB38.0  81.00 12.00 8.00 
EB39.0  78.00 14.00 8.00 
EB40  73.00 17.00 10.00 
EB41.0  79.00 13.00 8.00 
EB42  77.00 13.00 10.00 
EB43.1  81.00 12.00 7.00 
EB44.1  73.00 18.00 9.00 
EB44.2  60.00 28.00 12.00 
EB46.0  69.00 23.00 8.00 
EB47.1  71.00 19.00 10.00 
EB48.0  75.00 18.00 6.00 
EB49  80.00 12.00 7.00 
EB50.0  81.00 12.00 7.00 
EB51.0  77.00 13.00 10.00 
EB52.0  78.00 14.00 8.00 
EB53  82.00 9.00 9.00 
EB55.1  82.00 11.00 7.00 
EB56.2  75.00 17.00 8.00 
EB61  75.00 16.00 9.00 
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3.4. General Assessment 
 
Looking at the Union-wide figures regarding public support for European Union 
membership and for CFSP, it emerges that people favor the development of a common 
foreign and security policy. With support levels consistently above 60 percent, CFSP 
enjoys even more affirmation than EU membership across the Union. The overall pattern 
suggests a 5 to 12 percent cushion in favor of CFSP. ESDP, on the other hand, has 
significantly higher levels of support among European citizens over both EU membership 
and CFSP. At least seven out of ten people favor a defense and security/military policy. 
This is a very surprising result, given that foreign policy and security sectors are the two 
areas where the EU achieved the least amount of integration. 
An initial assessment of the numbers, therefore, suggests the following question. Why 
is it that although support for the idea of a common defense, and to a lesser extent of a 
common foreign and security policy, is quite considerable among Europeans, this seeming 
enthusiasm on the part of the public is, as we have seen, not reflected in the actual 
institutionalization of CFSP and ESDP? From an intergovernmentalist perspective, as 
explained above, the answer would take account of the supposition that public opinion is 
not a direct determinant of national preferences on security integration. 
Indeed, once we take those who have no opinion on both of these matters into 
consideration, another aspect of the issue is revealed. People are either not informed about 
what these policies stand for and what their substances are. At least one out of ten 
Europeans when asked about ESDP and nearly 20 percent in the case of CFSP cannot give 
their opinion. This lack of knowledge cannot be rationalized as part of the general 
perspective towards the EU, since more than 95 percent of the EU public has something to 
say about the Union. Here, then, the respondents might be uninformed as a result of their 
lack of concern in foreign policy and defense issues and/or it might as well be a result of 
the inadequacy of information disclosed to the public. Although this particular component 
of the survey does not reveal enough information in support of either argument, they both 
point to an “information deficit” on the part of the public, enabling them to be influenced 
by national governments and their domestic political context. (Anderson 1998) This brings 
to mind a related question. Why does this information deficit lead to an increased support 
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rather than a decreased support? Again a possible intergovernmentalist explanation here 
would include the possibility that the public opinion is ‘cued’ by the national governments 
in a certain way that popular opinion sways to a more positive position. 
So in order to understand the nature of this seeming support towards CFSP/ESDP, we 
have to look at the more specific questions regarding the public attitudes. In general, people 
cite foreign policy at the bottom of their list of EU topics they want more information on, 
along with TV and film policy, cultural policy and the like. This is evident even in Spring 
1998 (Eurobarometer 49) results where CFSP was cited by 14 percent while the need for 
information on their citizenship rights, the European currency and employment policy were 
all mentioned by at least 40 percent of the respondents. It was significant in that the survey 
was conducted at a time when ground troops were being deployed in Macedonia and the 
Balkans were getting back on the European security agenda. 
Moreover, when asked to prioritize a list of items on the EU program, people 
consistently put matters related to foreign policy, security and defense at the bottom of their 
lists, opting instead for issues concerning poverty, health and social policy, employment, 
education and the like. Indeed, the Spring 1996 survey (Eurobarometer 45), conducted 
months after the Dayton agreement temporarily stabilized the Balkans after five years of 
conflict, revealed that a “European army for common defense” was definitely not a key 
priority for the EU public. It was placed at the bottom of 33 issues, the top consisting of 
obvious daily concerns such as “joint programmes to fight unemployment.” 
On the whole, these numbers illustrate that even though the overall public support for 
the idea of a common European defense and foreign and security policy is quite 
considerable across the EU, this support seems to be somewhat superficial and vague, and 
directed towards an abstract concept which public have neither information on nor interest 
for. (Manigart 2001) And this lack of information and interest increases the member state 
governments’ ability to maintain national preferences autonomous of the public opinion. 
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3.5. Member States’ Perspective 
 
National preferences and government positions of Britain, Germany and France are 
more or less reflected in their public attitudes towards EU membership and CFSP/ESDP. 
Support for membership has been the lowest in Britain with affirmation rates 15 to 20 
percent lower and the opposition 5 to 10 percent higher than the EU average, whereas 
Germany and France are on or above EU figures. As expected from their national 
preferences, German and French support levels are consistently above the EU aggregates 
for both policies. As the most Euroskeptic of the three (or of the EU, for that matter) 
Britain, the “awkward partner” (George 1998), scores below the EU average on foreign 
policy and defense issues. It is also the only country whose support for CFSP has dropped 
below 50 percent of the population. One could attribute this opposition to a higher level of 
information on the part of the public, but the British perceive themselves to have the least 
amount of knowledge among Europeans.13  This lack of information could perhaps explain 
the considerable and somewhat surprising support for a common defense on the part of the 
British public up until the middle of the decade. But regardless of the reason of the support, 
foreign policy and defense issues are not top priorities for the British (or for Germans and 
French), following the larger EU-sample. These patterns, when juxtaposed to the official 
British stance in the first half of the 1990s towards the prospects of a common defense 
supports the argument that public opinion responds to a lead from the political elites rather 
than the other way around. (Brigid and Stubb 2003) 
The consequent abrupt downfall of support levels for ESDP, most notably in Britain 
but also in France, on the other hand, can be interpreted in several ways. First of all, it is 
part of a general pattern where public opinion on ESDP in Britain and France seem to 
fluctuate more than Germany, where it enjoys a high and steady support. The explanation 
for this pattern involves the ability and willingness of the former two in conducting 
autonomous foreign policies outside the EU structure; whereas Germany, with a 
constitution that until recently prohibited sending troops outside its borders, has 
traditionally regarded the EU as the legitimate outlet for foreign policy. More specifically, 
the turn of the public opinion corresponds to the escalation of the Bosnian conflict and 
                                                 
13 Extensive results can be obtained from Eurobarometer 55. 
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support for ESDP hits a decade low in January 1996, immediately after the US-brokered 
Dayton agreement in December 1995. This can be construed as the disillusionment of the 
British and French public against the failed attempts at a common policy, as reflected in the 
phrase “the three years of humiliation of Europe in Bosnia,” (Pond 1999) at a time when 
they could have acted separately from the Union. 
Perhaps more striking is the interplay between British domestic dynamics and their 
reflections in Britain’s u-turn in the last half of the decade in favor of the ESDP. The 
recovery of public support for a common defense overlapped with the ascension of the 
more pro-European Labour Party into power. The position of the Labour itself was a result 
of a mid 1980s switch between the party and the Conservatives, affecting the attitudes of 
their electorates. (George and Bache 2001) 
This upturn of the public opinion reached its post-1996 peak in November 1998, and 
one month later the St Malo defense initiative was introduced by the British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair. In the following spring when the Kosovo conflict was intensifying, British 
opposition to ESDP fell to pre-1996 levels and an ICM/Observer poll found that support for 
the bombing campaign reached over 70 percent. (Vickers 2000) The interaction between 
the new government’s pro-ESDP initiative and the shifts in public attitude can be explained 
to be a consequence of  
a) a growing dissatisfaction on the part of the British public putting pressure on the 
Blair government to modify their preferences (Pond 1999), or b) a deliberate attempt by the 
British government to display that Britain was “a leader, not a follower” in order to 
persuade the public that British membership in the EU was indeed beneficial to the country. 
(Sjursen 2001) 
In the end, irrespective of the accurate explanation, that is, whether a domestic 
pressure arose as a response to an external event (i.e. Kosovo) influencing the national 
position at the EU-level or the government was able to manipulate public opinion to justify 
its actions and to increase its domestic support, the intergovernmentalist rationale is not 
violated. For it was either because public priorities shifted because of externalities so that 
domestic pressure on the government for security integration increased or the national 
government utilized the domestic information deficit to raise their domestic support.  
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3.6. Conclusions 
 
This general analysis of Eurobarometer data regarding the attitudes of the European 
public reveals interesting results and a seeming paradox: Although a considerable majority 
of the EU citizens support CFSP and ESDP, foreign/security and defense policies remain 
under the absolute control of national governments and European integration in these areas 
play the second-fiddle to economic and monetary union. While this contradiction does not 
go against the premises of the intergovernmentalist theory, the dynamics behind this 
overwhelming public support needs further investigation. Further research on the 
correlation between public support and security integration might be in order
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that an intergovernmentalist account is more 
relevant to understanding the state of European security integration and that it has more 
explanatory power in revealing its development and dynamics than the neofunctionalist 
theory of European integration offers. 
Both of these traditional theories of European integration posit the fundamental 
assumption that security is an area that is qualitatively different from other areas of 
integration, in that it delineates the border between low-politics and high-politics. The 
opposing positions of the intergovernmentalist supremacy of nation-state interests and the 
neofunctionalist logic of a creeping supranationalism respectively distinguish security 
integration as a barrier and threshold to support their own explanations of European 
integration. Specifically, the intergovernmentalist account takes security as the point where 
the integration process shows its limits; whereas from a neofunctionalist perspective it is a 
threshold that the spillover effects of previous integration are bound to pass. 
In investigating the validity of these positions, that is whether security is a barrier set 
up by the nation-states against further supranational integration that would endanger their 
existence or whether it is a boundary for the common European institutions to overcome, 
the study attempted to incorporate the historical dynamics into the analysis of the particular 
instances of European security integration.     
 An initial discussion of the evolution of post-World War II security integration 
exposed that this process has not been continuous and progressive as the neofunctionalist 
account would predict, rather it has been inconsistent and interrupted in its aims, 
procedures and dynamics. The development of a coherent and incisive common foreign and 
security policy have been and continue to be hindered by the conflicts and compromises 
between those favouring the status quo of intergovernmental Europe, on the one hand, and 
others opting for a supranational vision of Europe.  
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It was revealed that at the core of the conflict was the issue of where sovereignty 
would reside, that is, whether in its traditional locus the nation-state, or in the supranational 
Community institutions. The discussion showed that throughout the evolution of security 
integration, the balance between the member states and EU institutions has constantly been 
tipped in favour of the nation-state. The national interests have been dominant over those of 
the community interests, proving that nation-state still perceives security to be the ultimate 
bastion of its sovereignty and is not willing to cede its control over security and defense to 
EU institutions in the absence of any substantial pressure from the public.  
The second chapter utilized the theories derived from the aforementioned competing 
visions of Europe to analyze the cases of the CFSP and the ESDP as examples of profound 
leaps in European security integration. Contrasting the neofunctionalist proposition that 
security integration is a quasi-automatic process led by EU-institutions, particularly the 
Commission, with the intergovernmentalist prediction that it is the perceived interests of 
the member states and the bargaining processes between them that determine the 
architecture of security integration, the Intergovernmental Conferences leading to the 
Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties were analyzed. Testing the intergovernmentalist 
hypothesis that “security integration through the CFSP/ESDP can be explained by focusing 
on the member state preferences and the bargaining processes between them” for its 
applicability in these specific instances of integration, the chapter demonstrated that in each 
case the main propeller of security integration was the overlapping of national interests as 
displayed in the lowest common denominator agreements of the IGCs in the absence of 
substantial public pressure and sustainable convergence of member state interests.  
Related to the premises of intergovernmentalism, the last chapter focused on public 
support for security integration in the member states. Relatively marginalized by the 
neofunctionalist explanations as a result of their emphasis on institutions and elite 
interaction, intergovernmentalism considers public opinion as a potential explanatory 
variable in domestic preference formation. Although the findings derived from the post- 
Maastricht Eurobaromater surveys did not violate the intergovernmentalist expectations, 
they revealed considerable and somewhat surprising levels of support for foreign policy 
and security integration. These results also lent credibility to the intergovernmentalist 
proposition of a possibility of a shift in national preferences affected by domestic pressure 
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on the governments in the face of an external security event, as it was the case with the 
Kosova conflict and its effects on British public opinion. In any case, since 
intergovernmentalism does not offer the theoretical tools to analyze the nature of the 
correlation between public opinion and security integration, further research regarding this 
particular link might be in order.   
In the end, the thesis as a whole confirms the position of the intergovernmentalist 
account of security integration to a large extent. The post-1945 European security 
integration has been far from what the neofunctionalist propose: an automatic process by 
which power is gradually transferred to a new center following a linear evolutionary line. 
Rather, the leitmotif of the overall historical development and the specific cases of security 
integration presented in this study has been the constant and significant discrepancy 
between the rhetoric and substance in security integration. The aspirations of the original 
treaties have proved to be too visionary as a result of the inadequacy of the institutional 
arrangements agreed upon to reach them. The states have constantly worked to limit the 
competencies transferred to the community structures because of their concern over their 
perceived national interests, resulting in a capabilities-expectations gap in the Union. 
Although the construction of EU institutions initiated a socialization process that 
perpetuated a consultation reflex among the national governments, it has failed to provide 
substantial and sustainable convergence of national interests. The historical pattern suggests 
that unless member states are confident that this kind of convergence is attained, an 
institutional design that will transfer national competencies in security matters to the EU 
institutions cannot be realized. 
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